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ABSTRACT
China is the world's second largest energy consumer and second largest
producer of greenhouse gases after the United States. Despite its remarkable success
in energy conservation over the past two decades, China's energy efficiency is far
behind developed countries. Further improvements in energy efficiency are crucial to
China's sustainable development.
In this study, I focus on energy-efficiency financing because I believe that
financial constraint is one of the most critical barriers to energy-efficiency projects. The
concept of the Energy service companies (ESCO) is a financing innovation of energy-
efficiency projects that has been widely used in North America and Europe and was
recently introduced in developing/transitional countries. As one of the main components
of the WB/GEF China Energy Conservation Project, the ESCO concept was introduced
in China in 1996. The ESCOs are called energy management companies (EMCs) in
China. I elaborate the ESCO concept, how ESCOs work, and EMCs' current progress
in China. Through two case studies of excess coal-gas recovery, I discuss the
feasibility of two energy-efficiency projects and how EMCs can effectively promote the
projects through their financing services.
China's EMCs are still in the nascent stage. Through the comparative analysis of
ESCOs' development in the United States, South Korea, Hungary, India, and China, I
identify the key factors influencing ESCOs' development and analyze their implications
for China. I emphasize the importance of government-supported policy to EMCs'
development and provide some detailed recommendations for the government to
promote the development of the market for energy-efficiency projects, the development
of the local financing market, and the development of EMCs' capability to conduct
energy-efficiency projects. Finally, I expect that China's EMCs will prosper with China's
improvement in the financial market and legal system, as well as the placement of
government-supported policy. EMCs' successful development will support sustainable
development both in China and the world.
Thesis Supervisor: Karen R. Polenske, Professor of Regional Political Economy and
Planning, Department of Urban Studies and Planning
Thesis Reader: Claude Lupis, Visiting Professor and Senior Lecturer, Department of
Materials Science and Engineering
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Improving energy efficiency has been an important cornerstone in China's energy
policy for 20 years. Without further dramatic improvements in energy efficiency, China's
long-term economic growth will not be physically, financially, or environmentally
sustainable. Although many energy-efficiency projects are identified as being
economically attractive, technologically feasible, and environmentally friendly, investors
severely under invest in them. Why is this the case?
Several studies (e.g., WB 1998 and Cui n.d.) as well as my field trip to China
have shown that financial constraint is one of the most critical barriers to implementing
energy-efficiency projects. The purpose of my research is therefore to find a financial
mechanism to assist China in improving its energy efficiency.
Energy Service Company (ESCO) financing, as a financing innovation of energy-
efficiency projects, has been widely used in North America and Europe, and it has been
recently introduced in China, where it is done by Energy Management Companies
(EMCs). My hypothesis is that EMCs, as a newly introduced industry, will provide an
effective financing mechanism to help China improve its energy efficiency. In this
research, I will focus on EMCs' application in the cokemaking and the iron and steel-
making industries. I choose the two sectors because of their great importance to
China's energy intensity and pollution. The two sectors consume around 1.8% of the
total energy consumption in China (China Energy Statistical Yearbook 1997-1999,
2001). I will study the investment potential of the recovery of excess coal gas in these
industries as a case to support my hypothesis. Through comparison with ESCOs'
development in some other countries, I will focus on the importance of government
policy in helping China's EMCs develop. I will also discuss the opportunities and
challenges faced by China's EMC business and its future prospects.
The results of my research should be useful to EMCs, coal-related enterprises,
financial institutions, investment companies, policy analysts, planners, and
organizations interested in energy conservation and efficiency in China and in other
countries.
Methodology
I conducted an extensive literature search, case studies of two energy-efficiency
projects, and interviews with practitioners and policy-makers. I use case studies, cost-
benefit analysis, and comparative analysis to obtain my research findings.
Case Studies
To support my hypothesis, I choose case studies as the major means to analyze
the investment potential for EMCs in China's coal-related industry. I use two cases to
analyze the feasibility and potential for EMCs to invest in the excess coal-gas recovery
in iron and steel plants and in cokemaking plants. The first case is a project that uses
the excess coal gas to substitute for the heavy oil. It was done by one pilot EMC in a
large iron and steel company as a demonstration case. The second case is the excess
coal-gas recovery for use in a power plant. This project was done by a cokemaking
company itself in Shanxi Province before the EMC concept was introduced to China. To
preserve confidentiality, I do not name the two companies, but refer to them as
Company A in case one and Company B in case two. I compare the overall
performance of the two cases to see if EMCs' involvement in energy-efficiency projects
will improve the performance. I also examine the feasibility for EMCs to invest in the
type of energy-efficiency projects in the second case. From the perspective of the host-
companies, I especially analyze in what kind of situation they choose to contract with an
EMC to conduct energy-efficiency projects. From the perspective of EMCs, I analyze
the criteria of EMCs to choose host-companies and projects and the importance of
financial services they provide. I also examine the role of the government, local
financial institutions, and international financial institutions can play in the development
of energy-efficiency projects through case studies.
Cost-Benefit Analysis
I use three cost-benefit analysis methods-"simple payback period", discounted
cash flow (DCF) analysis, and weighing social impacts method--to quantify the project
feasibility for both cases and examine the energy saved, the cost reduced, and the
pollution prevented in each project. I use net present value (NPV), payback period, and
internal rate of return (IRR) as indicators to evaluate the project economic feasibility and
also use these indicators to examine the attractiveness of the project from the host
enterprise and EMCs' perspective for both cases. To understand the EMCs' investment
potential in the two cases, I conduct a sensitivity analysis to study how changes in
energy prices, corporate income tax, and interest rate influence the costs and benefits
of energy-efficiency projects.
Comparative Analysis
Because ESCOs have existed in North America for more than twenty years and
have also been introduced to other developing countries and emerging economies, I
conduct a comparative analysis to see the similarities and differences between China
EMCs and ESCOs in the United States, South Korea, Hungary, and India. Through the
comparative analysis, I focus on the following questions: What are the major factors
influencing ESCOs' development and how do financing modes affect ESCOs'
development? I especially examine the role of institutions in ESCOs' development and
what lessons China can learn to promote EMCs.
Overview of Chapters
The organization of the remaining chapters is as follows:
Chapter 2 provides a background of the study. In this chapter, I first describe
China's current energy-efficiency situation and the strategic importance of energy
efficiency in China. Then, I elaborate on the "energy-efficiency paradox" in China's
industry and identify the financing constraint as the most critical barrier impeding
energy-efficiency projects.
In Chapter 3, I briefly discuss the energy-efficiency financing strategies and
introduce several financing options focusing on the ESCO financing. I introduce the
concept of ESCOs, how ESCOs work, and the scope of ESCOs' clients. As ESCOs
were first started in the United States, through the overview of ESCOs in the U.S., I
discuss how the ESCO business began, how it evolved, how it works today, and the
factors influencing its development.
Chapter 4 provides the detailed information on China's EMCs. I review how the
EMC concept was introduced into China; then, I describe EMCs' current progress and
discuss the characteristics of China's EMCs.
Chapter 5 is composed of case studies of improving energy efficiency in coal-
related industries. I first analyze the potential of energy-efficiency improvement. Then,
I present two cases I studied on the waste coal-gas recovery to discuss the feasibility of
the two energy-efficiency projects, the financing issues, and the role EMCs can play.
In Chapter 6, through the comparative analysis of ESCOs' development process
in the United States, South Korea, Hungary, India, and China, I identify the key factors
influencing ESCOs' development and analyze their implications for China. Then, I give
policy suggestions on how to promote EMCs in China.
In Chapter 7, I summarize my findings including the benefits from promoting
EMCs in China, the challenges EMCs are facing, and the prospects for EMCs'
development in China.
CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND: AN "ENERGY-EFFICIENCY PARADOX"
Since 1993, China has become the second largest energy consumer after the
United States. In 1999, it consumed about 31.9 quadrillion British thermal units (Btu) of
energy versus 97.0 quadrillion Btu in the United States. Production and consumption of
coal, its dominant fuel, is the highest in the world (EIA, 2002). Correspondingly, since
1995, China ranks second in CO2 emissions after the United States. Meanwhile,
China's energy efficiency is far behind the United States and other developed countries
and there is a great potential to improve it. Thus, China's energy-efficiency policy will
have a significant impact both nationally and internationally. In this chapter, I first
describe China's current energy-efficiency situation and its strategic importance; then, I
discuss the "energy-efficiency paradox" in China's industry.
China's Energy-Efficiency Situation
Over the past two decades, China has achieved remarkable success in energy
conservation. Energy intensity, calculated as the primary commercial energy
consumption per unit of gross domestic product (GDP), declined on average by almost
5% annually from 1980 to 1998. In this period, primary energy consumption increased
4.9% annually, while GDP increased by 9.9% annually. The energy elasticity of GDP
for the period was only 0.48, being one of the lowest in the world (Wang, 2000, p.1). 1
In the United States, by contrast, the annual decline in energy intensity was 1.5% over
the years 1977-1997. These achievements resulted from Chinese government policies,
Energy elasticity of GDP is the degree to which an energy-consumption change results from one unit change in
GDP.
economic structure changes, and technology improvement. The government policies
ranged from strict energy quotas for enterprises to low-interest loans for equipment
upgrades and training for industrial energy managers. Without these improvements in
energy efficiency, China would be consuming about twice as much coal as it currently
does.
However, energy efficiency in China is still relatively low, and there exists a great
gap compared to developed countries. In 1998, China's energy consumption per dollar
of GDP remains nearly three times the world average level and over six times that of
Japan (Liu, 2002). The existing Chinese industry system is still rather backward as a
whole. The advanced industrial equipment and civil infrastructure only account for a
little proportion of total industrial equipment and civil infrastructure. Even worse, some
Chinese industrial systems with poor technology, low efficiency, and high energy-
consumption still develop rapidly due to the demand stimulation resulting from the high-
speed growth of the economy. The average energy consumption of major industries in
China ranges from 25% to 90% higher than that of similar industries in developed
countries, and the weighted average is 40% more (PMO, 1999, p. 8).
Table 2-1
Energy Consumption of Major Products: China Versus International Advanced Level
Country Steel Electricity Generation Cement
(kgcelton) (gce/KWh) (kgce/ton)
China 1350 370 170
Developed Countries 656 317 108
Source: Project Management Office (PMO), 1999, p. 8. World Bank/GEF China Energy
Conservation Promotion Project. Guide for China Joint Venture and Cooperative EMC
Development.
Note: 1. Unit abbreviation: kgce = kilogram coal equivalent, gce = gram coal equivalent,
KWh = kilowatt hour
2. The article refers to ton not tonne, but the author suspects that the unit for steel and
cement is kgce/tonne instead of kgce/ton (1 tonne = 1.102 tons).
Table 2-1 shows the comparison of current energy consumption of three major
energy-intensive products between China and the international advanced level. This
indicates that there is a great energy-saving potential in these energy-intensive
industries. According to a World Bank report (1998), the potential energy savings in
China's industrial sector between now and 2020 will be more than 500 million tonnes of
coal equivalent (Mtce) per year, or more than half of China's current annual energy
consumption. Even implementing domestically available advanced technology would
result in the energy savings of nearly one-third of the present energy consumption
(WWICS, 2002). The production capacities of many Chinese industries are reaching
the end of their life spans and creating an opportunity to improve technology and
equipment; therefore, China is in a critical phase of energy-efficiency improvement,
which has strategic importance in China.
Strategic Importance of Energy Efficiency in China
The improvement of energy efficiency can effectively relieve the pressure of the
future energy demand and supply. According to the Energy Information Agency's
(EIA's) prediction, compared with growth of about 1 percent in the industrialized
countries, China's rapidly growing economy will drive energy demand growth by about
4-5 percent annually through 2015 (EIA, 2002). China has become a net importer of
energy, measured in Btu, since 1995 and is expected to become increasingly
dependent on imports2 (EIA, 1997). Without effective energy-efficiency policies, energy
shortages will become a severe constraint for China's future economic development. If
2 China is a net exporter of coal and is expected to remain the net coal exporter for the foreseeable future;
however, China has been a net importer of oil since 1993.
China's energy-efficiency level in 2020 can be raised to the present advanced
international level, energy demand could be reduced by 13-15% by 2050 (Wang, 2000,
p.1), which will substantially reduce the future energy-supply pressure and facilitate
sustainable economic growth.
The improvement of energy efficiency can effectively relieve the regional and
global environmental pressures. China suffers from major energy-related environmental
problems. According to a report by the World Health Organization (WHO), China has
seven of the world's ten most polluted cities. In the past 20 years, accompanying the
rapid development of Chinese economy, the emission of such pollutants as carbon
dioxide (C02), sulfur dioxide (SO2), and flue dust increased rapidly, leading to serious
environmental-pollution problems such as acid rain, soil acidification, and deforestation
in some areas. Currently, one-third of China's land area has been affected by acid rain
to various degrees. Without effective SO2 emission-control measures, S02 emissions
will increase from the present 17 million tonnes to 60 million tonnes by 2020 (Wang,
2000, p.1). This will lead to more severe acid rain and soil acidification problems further
increasing agricultural and forest destruction. An important reason behind this is that
energy consumption in China is coal dominated, and the proportion of direct combustion
without preparation (washing and sorting) is very high. Improved efficiency of existing
coal-fired power plants and technology advances in new plants could achieve
substantial reductions in greenhouse gas emissions and other forms of pollution.
Today, there are approximately 400,000 small industrial boilers in China consuming
about 300 million tonnes of coal per year. Efficiency improvements in these boilers
alone could save about 90 million tonnes of coal per year (Hecht, 1999), which will bring
substantial pollution reductions. Since 1995, China's C02 emissions have ranked the
second in the world only after United States. Wang (2000) predicts that without an
effective energy-efficiency policy, China's C02 emissions will surpass the United States,
and China will become the largest emitter in the world in the next 20 years. Therefore, it
is very necessary to improve energy efficiency, which can directly reduce CO2 and SO2
emissions and relieve both the regional and global environmental pressures, thus
promote sustainable economic development.
The improvement of energy efficiency can effectively reduce dependence on the
international energy market and increase energy security. Globalization has offered
China the opportunity to utilize both domestic and international energy resources.
However, to use energy resources in the international market, China has to face many
supply uncertainties, and energy security cannot be completely assured. According to
EIA's prediction (http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/china.html), China is expected to
surpass Japan as the second largest world oil consumer within the next decade and
reach a consumption level of 10.5 million barrels per day by 2020. Therefore, large
price fluctuations in the international market will severely affect China's economy and
national security. Energy-efficiency improvements can reduce energy demand, thus
lead to lower dependency on the international energy market.
The improvement of energy efficiency can also effectively increase economic
competitiveness. According to Wang (2000, p.1), in 1997, energy comprised 12% of
China's gross domestic product (GDP). This proportion is 5 and 9 percentage points
higher than that of in the United States and Japan, respectively. Energy consumption in
industry accounts for more than 70% of the total in China. Within industry, energy-
intensive sub-sectors, such as mining, power generation and heating supply, iron and
steel, nonferrous metals, building materials, chemicals, oil refinery and cokemaking,
account for more than 70% of the total.
Table 2-2
China's Energy Cost as Share of Total Production Cost
(Percent)
Industry Energy Cost/Total Production Cost
Iron and steel >25
Building materials 40-50
Fertilizer 70-75
Petrochemicals 40
Source: adapted from Wang, Wanxing, 2000, p. 2. " China's Energy Conservation
Policy." Beijing Energy Efficiency Center.
Table 2-2 shows that energy cost accounts for 40% or more of total production
cost in some major industries. As energy consumption in these industries is far higher
than that of similar industries in the developed countries, energy-efficiency
improvements will effectively reduce production cost and increase economic
competitiveness in China in the context of increasing globalization.
An "Energy-Efficiency Paradox" in China's Industry
China's current energy-efficiency situation shows that there exists great energy-
saving potential. Besides its strategic importance, the improvement of energy efficiency
will also bring significant economic benefits. It is estimated that every percent increase
in Chinese energy efficiency will lead to RMB13 billion of direct economic benefit (PMO,
n.d.). According to case studies done by the State Environmental Protection Agency
(SEPA) of China, a wide range of industrial-efficiency improvements is economically
feasible. Table 2-3 shows that the Internal Rate of Return (IRR) for selected energy-
efficiency investments in China's energy-intensive industries ranges from 15% to more
than 100%, while the basic internal rate of return in China is 12% (China's Agenda 21,
n.d.). This indicates that the IRR for energy-efficiency investments in Chinese
manufacturing enterprises is high enough to justify widespread application.3
Table 2-3
Internal Rate of Return for Selected Energy-Efficiency Investments in China
Investment Percent
Steel
Adoption of continuous casting 19
Reheating furnace renovation 36
Blast furnace gas recovery 41
Aluminum
Kiln renovation 84
Ammonia
Medium-sized plant restructuring 20
Small plant waste heat recovery 71
Caustic Soda
Adopting membrane electrolyzer 29
Cement
Medium-sized kiln renovation 15
Conversion from wet to dry process 19
Small-scale kiln renovation 35
Pulp and Paper
Adoption of cogeneration 25
Black liquor recovery 25
Textiles
Cogeneration in printing and dyeing 38
Caustic soda recovery 58
Computerized energy management >100
Source: Hamburger, J and Jonathan Sinton, 1996, p. 4. "Energy Efficiency Business in
China: A Roadmap for American Companies" http://www.pnl.gov/china/roadmap.pdf
The "Energy-Efficiency Paradox"
From the above analysis, we can see that improvements in energy efficiency are
a valuable resource that could create a win-win solution on multiple fronts. On a macro-
scale, energy efficiency can help to mitigate the mismatches between energy supply
and demand and lessen environment pollution, while on a micro-scale, energy-
efficiency improvements will help enterprises to lower energy costs and increase their
competitiveness. According to the WB research (World Bank, 1998), many energy-
3 The indicator of IRR should be used with caution to evaluate the project feasibility; especially, the
reference does not mention the capital investment and its financing structure.
efficiency projects are technologically feasible, economically sound, and
environmentally friendly; however, many of these projects are not undertaken. The
State Development Planning Commission predicts that during the Ninth Five-year Plan
the energy-saving investment of the whole society was only about 50% of the planned
investment scale for energy saving (PMO, 1999). Why is this the case? In the energy-
economics literature, the phenomenon that even profitable energy-saving projects are
not being undertaken is called an "energy-efficiency paradox" (Cui, n.d.). It represents a
case in which business firms, which are often presumed to be economically efficient,
make decisions that do not maximize profits. What are the reasons for the "energy-
efficiency paradox" in China's industry?
Barriers to Energy-Efficiency Projects
The main reasons China has not undertaken these energy-efficiency projects
relate to barriers the country has confronted. The World Bank (1998) cites the following
six factors that play a role.
1. Weak Cost-Consciousness. Chinese enterprises usually have weak cost-
consciousness. They are more enthusiastic about increasing enterprise profits through
expanding their scale and occupying a larger market-share, rather than investing in
energy-conservation projects to reduce future energy-operating costs. Although the
profit motive and market competition are rapidly increasing cost-consciousness in
Chinese enterprises, it takes time for management methods and attitudes to change.
2. Demand for Short Payback Periods. Enterprise managers or potential
investors assess energy-conservation projects in terms of their payback period, rather
than by their life-cycle rate of return. To avoid future uncertainty, they are not interested
in the conservation investments with payback periods of more than five years unless
there are other pressures.
3. Risk and Uncertainty. Compared to investments in output expansion that
involve physical, easily perceived benefits, the benefits from energy-saving investments
are future cost savings, which are associated with more risk and uncertainty. In
addition, flexibility to respond to rapid market changes is critical in China today. Long
payback periods mean funds are tied up; therefore, more risk and uncertainty are
involved.
4. Lack of Adequate Information. Often, Chinese enterprise managers do not
carry out viable energy-conservation investments because they have not recognized
these opportunities. They particularly lack practical information on actual enterprise
experience with different technical measures and the details of the actual cost savings
and increased profits.
5. Low Financial Significance and Transaction Costs. Even if the rates of return
are high and payback periods are acceptable, enterprise managers may not consider
these feasible energy-conservation projects as priority investments, because net
benefits are not large relative to the size of the enterprise. The staff's time and effort of
to gather information, design projects, undertake the relevant analysis, and implement
the projects may not be worthwhile.
6. Lack of Financing. For many energy-conservation projects, although
enterprise managers realize the investment opportunities, they cannot carry them out
because of inadequate funds for investment. A more common financing problem is that
domestic banks are not used to lending for energy-efficiency projects, as they know little
about this kind of investment that does not directly result in increased production.
As China is transforming from a planned economy to a market economy, the
authorities have lessened the administrative function of government agencies in charge
of energy-saving investments and services, and the government has substantially
reduced its special energy-saving fund, which was the major financing source for
energy-efficiency projects. Therefore, financial constraints of enterprises have turned
out to be a major barrier impeding implementation of attractive energy-efficiency
projects in China. Cui (n.d., p. 5) also discusses in his paper that "compared to the
price distortion, ownership effect, and lax environmental law enforcement, financial
burden and constraints of the firms is a [are] more substantial barrier[s] to the diffusion
of clean coal technology."
With the ongoing conversion of China's economic system to a market economy,
the government's ability to promote energy efficiency directly will be far more difficult
than in the past decade. The system for promoting energy efficiency and pollution
reduction must be transformed to operate more effectively in a market economy. One
solution may be to find a self-financing and market-oriented solution.
CHAPTER 3
FINANCING ENERGY-EFFICIENCY PROJECTS AND ESCOS
Financing for energy efficiency in the current market economy faces this kind of
dilemma: financiers will not be interested in energy efficiency until there is a sufficient
volume of projects with attractive returns that require financing; however, project
development is impeded by the lack of confidence that adequate financing will be
available and the absence of knowledge of how to identify and structure a bankable
project. Here, I discuss some energy-efficiency financing strategies and options, and
then focus on the approach of financing through energy service companies (ESCOs).
Energy-Efficiency Financing Strategies
An energy-efficiency project is an initiative undertaken to improve the efficiency
of energy use in a commercial, industrial, institutional, or residential facility. The
incremental costs of high-efficiency equipment and related engineering services are
recovered from savings on the energy bill. Before energy-efficiency financing can be
secured, a market must be developed, project identified, partners selected, engineering
and economic analyses conducted, and a decision to invest made. However, all these
actions hinge on the ability to obtain financing. When the market conditions are not
favorable, the likelihood of obtaining financing will not be high. As mentioned earlier, a
number of barriers impeding energy-efficiency projects are actually interrelated.
Therefore, energy-efficiency financing strategists must first work on market
fundamentals: favorable market conditions, motivated stakeholders, and compelling
economics. Improving market fundamentals is critical to energy-efficiency financing, but
also a challenging and long process. I discuss in detail what the government can do to
improve it in Chapter 6.
Financing Options
Government funding used to be the major source of energy-efficiency financing
in China and some other developing countries. As China transforms to a market-
oriented economy, commercial financing is becoming an important source of funds for
energy-efficiency projects. Commercial financing sources include loans and lines of
credit, lease financing, trade financing, consumer credit, vendor financing, mortgage
financing, and project financing (HBC, 1996). Here, I discuss lease financing, vendor
financing, and project financing through ESCOs, primarily focusing on the later.
Lease Financing
Lease financing is an important financing structure that is comparable to loans
and lines of credit. It allows the user of a leased asset (the lessee) to avoid using
capital up-front to acquire the asset. The finance lease, also referred to as a "capital
lease" or "installment purchase agreement," is a typical structure for leasing equipment
(HBC, 1996). Under a finance lease, repayments for up to 100% of the equipment
and/or project costs are spread out over the lease term. The lessee usually has an
option to take title to the equipment at the end of the term. Leasing can be used to
finance almost all types of energy-efficiency equipment, and it has several advantages
over purchasing the equipment. First, the lessee's initial payment is a lease payment,
which is smaller than the total cost. Second, the lease can be structured so that cost
savings will be greater than the lease payment, thus generating a positive cash flow.
Finally, lease contracts can be structured flexibly to be combined with other financing
sources or to provide up to 100% of the total financing. Leasing works best with simple
equipment and large quantities of sales or installations. Lease financing has been
used successfully for energy efficiency in the United States. A large portion of energy-
efficiency projects in the United States are now financed on a lease basis. Companies
such as GE Capital, CIT Financial, BankOne, and Citicorp are aggressively marketing
lease-financing services for energy-efficiency equipment (HBC, 1996).
Vendor financing
Vendor financing is a programmatic relationship between an equipment marketer
(the "vendor") and a financial-services company to provide financing at the point of sale.
The vendor could be a manufacturer, a distributor, or a retailer. The vendor assumes
the responsibility for documentation and other administrative tasks and shares in the
transaction costs. The vendor is also the aggregator of capital demand. Vendor
financing works well with high-volume sales of small products to customers in the
residential and small commercial/industrial sectors (IIEC, 1998). The vendor may
provide certain credit enhancements and, if sufficient numbers of transactions are
pooled, the vendor can evaluate credit based on the portfolio as a whole, which helps to
save transaction costs and makes possibly extending credit to more end-users than
before (HBC, 1996). It is similar to leasing in that vendor financing lends itself to a
statistical or portfolio risk-management approach to end-user credit risk. There are two
types of agreements under a vendor- financing scheme: (1) the agreement between the
financier and the vendor, and (2) the agreement between the customer and the vendor.
The vendor/financier agreement defines the terms that can be offered to the customer,
such as rates, length of term, and necessary documentation. The vendor/customer
agreement defines the repayment terms for the loan. For energy-efficient equipment,
these agreements can be structured so that the customer payments are lower than the
value of the energy savings, thus generating a positive cash flow (IIEC, 1998).
Either lease financing or vendor financing is possible only in countries having a
fairly well-developed capital-market and appropriate laws. Neither of these is well
developed in China. However, both lease financing and vendor financing can be
imbedded into the ESCO financing, which is described in detail below.
Innovation of ESCOs
Energy service company (ESCO) financing is frequently employed in the
financing of energy-efficiency projects. It has been widely used in North America and
Europe, but is relatively new in developing countries. Under this financing scheme, an
end-user, such as an industry, institution, or utility, which is seeking to improve its
energy efficiency, contracts with an ESCO for energy-efficiency services and financing.
What are ESCOs?
According to the National Association of Energy Service Companies (NAESCO),
an ESCO, or Energy Service Company, is a business that develops, installs, and
finances projects designed to improve the energy efficiency and maintenance costs for
energy-consuming facilities over certain periods, normally ranging from two to ten years
(http://www.naesco.org/meminfo.htm#whatisesco). ESCOs differ from consulting firms
offering energy-efficiency services or equipment manufacturers by using the concept of
performance contracting. A performance contract ties payment and financing directly to
the amount of energy that is actually saved in the customer's facility (Figure 3-1).
ESCOs are relatively young, being first developed in North America in the late
1970s. In the developing world, ESCOs were started only recently. ESCOs have
different names in different countries: they are called Third-Party Financing (TPF) in
Europe and Energy-Management Companies (EMCs) in China.
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Source: Lee, Myung-Kyoon, et al., 2003. "Promoting Energy Efficiency Financing and ESCOs in
Developing Countries: Experiences from Korean ESCO Business." Journal of Cleaner Production.
Figure 3-1
A Performance Contract Ties Payment Directly to the Amount of Energy Saved
How do ESCOs work?
An ESCO, as a specialized profit-seeking energy-management company works
by using the concept of energy-performance contracting. Generally, an ESCO provides
the following series of energy-saving services:
1. Energy audit: investigating and analyzing the energy-efficiency condition of a
customer (the "host" enterprise) who is willing to implement energy-efficiency
renovation.
2. Energy-conservation project design: based on the results of an energy-
efficiency audit, an ESCO proposes to the customer how to utilize mature technology to
improve energy efficiency and reduce energy costs. The ESCO will design the energy
improvement if the host enterprise seems likely to accept the option.
3. Contract endorsement: the ESCO signs the energy-performance contract with
the host enterprise through negotiation. The ESCO will charge the enterprise the
expense of the energy-efficiency audit and project design if the enterprise does not sign
an energy-management contract.
4. Help with project financing: the ESCO uses its capital or that of a third party,
such as a commercial bank, to help the host enterprise finance the energy-conservation
project.
5. Execution, installation, and adjustment: the ESCO is responsible for execution,
installation, and adjustment of the energy-conservation project and for the application of
"turn-key engineering."
6. System-operating improvement, maintenance, and overhaul: the ESCO also
carries out the systems-maintenance and the operator-training work.
7. Energy savings and energy-saving benefits guarantee: the ESCO, together
with the host enterprise, monitors and verifies the energy savings during the contract
validity period.
8. The ESCO shares the energy-saving profits with the host enterprise: the
ESCO holds the ownership of the equipment and shares the energy-saving profits of the
energy-efficiency project with the host enterprise. The equipment ownership normally is
transferred to the enterprise after all the investment, operating cost, risk expense, and
reasonable profits have been compensated. The enterprise eventually owns the high-
efficiency equipment, which reduces its energy costs and enables it to enjoy all the
energy-saving benefits.
From the above processes, we see that the operation of an ESCO is to provide
investment-management services, which can reduce energy costs, rather than to sell
specific products and technologies.
One of the most important ESCO services is to help the host enterprise finance
energy-efficiency projects. There are two basic financing models. Under the first model
(Figure 3-2), a bank provides the necessary project financing to the ESCO through a
loan contract; the ESCO provides the service with a performance contract; the customer
pays the ESCO if the project meets its performance standards; and the ESCO repays
the bank for the project loan. Therefore, the customer has no financial obligation other
than to pay the ESCO a percentage of the realized savings over a specified period of
time; while the ESCO not only assumes project-performance risk, but also assumes
customer credit risk by borrowing the money for project financing itself. This model is
also called Shared Savings.
Under the second model (Figure 3-3), the customer has two contracts: (1) an
energy-performance contract with the ESCO, and (2) a project-finance loan with the
bank. The customer, not the ESCO, is responsible for repaying the project loan, and
the loan is a traditional agreement with the customer's creditworthiness guaranteeing
the payback of the loan. If the project does not succeed, the ESCO has to pay the
customer, as agreed in the performance contract. This model is also called Guaranteed
Savings and is the primary ESCO project-financing vehicle in North America. The
ESCOs work closely with their bankers and bring the financing to the customer.
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Figure 3-2
Financing Model 1: ESCO Arranges Financing and Bears Financial Risk
The shared-saving model is usually more attractive to the customer than the
guaranteed-saving model especially when the customer lacks capitals or finds it hard to
access capitals; therefore, the shared-saving model is more popular when ESCOs are
in their initial development stage and new to customers. China's EMCs are using the
shared-saving model.
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Source: ESMAP, 1999, p.14. Energy Service Companies (ESCOs) Practitioners Workshop Summary.
http://www.worldbank.orq/html/fpd/esmap/ESCOreport.pdf
Figure 3-3
Financing Model 2: the Bank Finances the Project Directly to the Customer
Scope of ESCOs' clients
The scope of ESCOs' clients may include any type of energy end-users with
significant annual energy costs, including the following categories:
" Municipal institutions, such as schools, hospitals, etc. In these cases, the
municipality countersigns the ESCO contracts between the institutions and the
ESCOs.
" Municipalities that wish to modernize their public-lighting systems.
* Government institutions and companies, such as big universities, libraries, or the
national railways. ESCOs may require that the contracts are countersigned by
the relevant ministries.
* Poorly capitalized industrial companies or business actors who enter ESCO
arrangements in order to assure financing for their energy-efficiency
developments.
* Well-capitalized industrial companies or business actors that wish to outsource
their energy supplies.
* District heating companies seeking to buy cheap heat from cogeneration
entrepreneurs.
* Residential communities that want ESCOs to arrange financing for their energy
developments. A typical subcategory is residential communities that wish to
disconnect from the district-heating network and introduce individual gas heating.
Overview of U.S. ESCOs
As mentioned above, ESCOs were first started in the United States. In this
section, through the overview of U.S. ESCOs, I discuss how ESCOs began, how they
evolved, how they work today, and the factors critical to their success.
Origins
U.S. ESCOs were first started in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The impetus
was the dramatic energy-price rise following the 1973 Arab oil embargo and the Iranian
Revolution in 1979, which presented the opportunity to help businesses reduce
customers' growing energy costs (Cudahy and Dreessen, 1996).
There are three major categories of ESCOs. The first category is the ESCOs
that grew out of the consulting business providing engineering services for a fee. Most
of these consulting engineers specialized in performing detailed energy audits of clients'
buildings, proposing designs for new energy systems, and suggesting improvements to
operating practices. They developed designs that combined entirely new equipment
with retrofits of existing equipment, and they proposed changes in the way buildings
were operated and industrial processes carried out. The engineers made some profit
selling their expertise, but stood to earn higher margins by acting as general contractors
in implementing their recommendations. Despite the surge in energy costs, however,
the engineers had trouble selling services alone: a large number of clients either could
not afford, or, out of uncertainty over the results, chose not to invest in the proposed
improvement. As a consequence, some engineering firms, sensing an opportunity in
cash-strapped (or simply risk-averse) customers faced with rising energy costs,
fundamentally altered their business in response. They moved from consulting to
project development, with the expectation that by assuming higher levels of risk, they
would receive substantially higher returns.
The second category of ESCOs comprises manufacturers of building-controls
systems designed to regulate energy-using equipment in buildings and factories. The
earliest entrants in this category responded to the rise in energy prices by offering
control systems specifically designed to reduce their customers' energy bills. Then, in
the early 1980s, these companies took the additional step of establishing energy-
service divisions to develop performance-based projects centered on their control
systems. Like the consulting engineers, these manufacturers extended their traditional
lines of business to assume the risks associated with project development.
The last major category includes those ESCOs formed in response to the growth
of utility demand-side management (DSM) programs, either by the utility themselves or
by private investors. Numerous utilities have launched DSM programs that complement
ESCO projects; for example, utility customers have used rebate programs to improve
the cost-effectiveness and comprehensiveness of their performance-based projects.
Utilities usually enter the ESCO business by acquiring control of ESCOs already in
existence.
Initial Drivers
During the development history of U.S. ESCOs, three main sets of external
factors drove their growth, especially in the initial stage. The most important one was
energy prices. The changes of energy prices not only directly affect demand for energy-
efficiency services but also affect end-users' perceptions of their importance, which has
a distinct impact on their interest in efficiency investments, especially when the changes
are precipitous. According to Cudahy and Dreessen (1996), energy prices-at historic
highs from 1980 to 1983-contributed to an estimated 35% annual growth rate in ESCO
investments during this period.
The second set of external factors was certain tax incentives available to
investors in U.S. energy projects through the mid-1 980s. The two most important were
the energy tax credit, available for investments in energy conservation (until
approximately 1983), and the investment tax credit, which was applied to general capital
investment (including investments in efficiency-efficiency projects) until 1986.
In addition to energy prices and tax incentives, utility DSM bidding programs
were the third external factor influencing the U.S. ESCO industry. The first utility DSM
bidding program appeared in late 1987 (undertaken by Central Maine Power), initiating
a period of relatively substantial utility contributions to the pool of investment capital
underwriting performance-based efficiency projects. Because of the launch of DSM
programs, ESCOs regained the high growth rate at 25% per year during 1988-1994.
(Cudahy and Dreessen, 1996)
Current Status
The number and revenues of ESCOs have grown rapidly over the last decade,
with revenues increasing at a 24% annualized rate, and the estimated investment in this
type of business in 2000 was 1.8-2.1 billion (Goldman, et al., 2002). Growth has slowed
since 1996, with a 9% annualized revenue growth over the period 1996-2000. ESCOs
are diverse and come in all shapes and sizes: ESCOs differ in terms of ownership,
target markets, technology focus/expertise, in-house capabilities, geographic
preferences, project financing, etc. There is no real "prototypical ESCO." However,
most ESCOs typically have the following capabilities and skills: project development,
engineering and design, feasibility analysis, energy analysis, general contracting, ability
to finance directly or arrange third-party financing, project and construction
management, purchase and installation of equipment, risk management, monitoring and
verification of savings, training, operations and maintenance services for the installed
equipment, and administrative services (Vine, et al., n.d.). Currently more than 60
national and regional ESCOs are active in the U.S. market. While ESCOs are typically
small to medium-sized companies (small companies have 1-5 employees and generate
$1-5 million annual sales; medium companies have 20-50 employees and generate
$10-30 million annual sales), a few firms, including some of the earliest ESCOs,
currently account for a majority of the industry revenues. For example, Northeast
Energy Services, Inc. (NORESCO) was established in 1981 as NEES Energy, Inc., an
ESCO subsidiary of New England Electric System, a large utility holding company
headquartered in Massachusetts. It was sold to management in 1989 and changed the
name to NORESCO. NORESCO has been one of the largest ESCOs in the United
States, with 15 full-service offices nationwide, over 250 employees and about $150
million in annual revenue. (http://www.noresco.com/site/content/company-history.asp).
Currently, none of the U.S. ESCOs is publicly traded. However, some are subsidiaries
of utilities (e.g., Sempra Energy Solutions, Alliant) and these utilities are publicly traded.
Figure 3-4 shows that institutional sector customers (all non-private) are ESCOs'
major customers, representing about 74% of the total (Goldman, et al., 2002). Of these,
the governments represent 20% and the educational institutes represent 39%. The
average payback period is seven years for institutional-sector projects and three years
in the private sector. Guaranteed savings contracts are the most common contracting
approaches ESCOs use. Thus, most ESCO projects are financed by the customer
borrowing directly from a bank or other lending institution.
Many U.S. ESCOs provide a wide range of services to the clients, rather than
just energy-efficiency improvements. Successful ESCOs integrate energy efficiency
with comprehensive solutions, such as productivity, environmental compliance, indoor
air quality, health/safety concerns, facility renovation and modernization, equipment
reliability. The enlarged scope of services has led to an evolution of super ESCOs in
the United States. The super ESCOs provide energy and energy-efficiency services to
utility customers and either compete or partner with utilities (Vine, et al., n.d.).
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Figure 3-4
ESCO Projects Primarily Target Institutional Market Sectors
Factors Critical to the Success of U.S. ESCOs
Governments in the United States have actively supported the development of
ESCOs and are one of their major customers, representing 20% of all ESCO
customers. Federal/state legislatures and agencies as well as policies and programs
supported by state public-utility commissions have played an important role in
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stimulating ESCOs' activity in various markets. The following factors contribute to the
success of U.S. ESCOs:
Legislative and regulatory developments: (1) Federal energy management required
by the 2000 Energy Policy and Conservation Act has opened the federal buildings
market to performance-based efficiency projects by ESCOs. (2) Most states have
enacted enabling policies or legislation to promote performance contracting in their
public sector institutional market; (3) Public-sector procurement reform has
facilitated the success of ESCOs in the institutional market;
. Incentives from Utilities: rebates and the performance-based payments associated
with DSM bidding programs, and standard performance-contract (SPC) programs
not only help open the market to ESCOs but also provide investment-financing
sources. Note that DSM bidding programs are also encouraged by federal
legislations.
After more than two decades' development, U.S. ESCOs have built an
impressive, steadily growing industry. The ESCO concept, as a market-oriented
energy-efficiency financing solution, has also rapidly spread to many other developed
and developing countries and has begun to play an important role in promoting energy
efficiency.
CHAPTER 4
ENERGY MANAGEMENT COMPANIES IN CHINA
Energy Management Companies (EMCs) in China were first introduced by the
"WB/GEF China Energy Conservation Project", jointly developed and implemented by
the State Economic and Trade Commission (SETC) and the World Bank (WB) as well
as the Global Environment Facility (GEF) in 1996. The main component of this project
was to introduce, demonstrate, and disseminate the energy-performance contracting
mechanism and develop the EMCs in China, by using fund and technical support of the
WB and the GEF.
Rationale of EMCs in China
Why did the WB/GEF project choose to develop the energy-performance
contracting mechanism and EMCs? As mentioned in Chapter 2, China is facing an
"energy-efficiency paradox," and the financing barrier is the most critical factor.
According to the more than 20 years of experience of ESCOs in North America, ESCOs
can remove two major barriers that impede energy-conservation and efficiency
investments in China: (1) inadequate financial incentives, and (2) a lack of capital for
project financing (WB 1998).
Energy-efficiency projects often carry high costs (particularly high opportunity
costs of key skilled enterprise personnel) for obtaining and checking information,
planning and design, arranging financing, implementation scheduling, monitoring initial
performance, and implementing necessary adjustments. EMCs can reduce the high
transactions costs to individual enterprises by undertaking the relatively small energy-
conservation investments and providing a low-risk guarantee to host enterprises.
Energy-performance contracting can help overcome financing problems and
allow host enterprises to undertake energy-efficiency investments with little or no
investment of their own. Because these are not loans to the host enterprise, and
payments to the EMCs are typically paid from reductions in operating costs, no debt for
the investment is carried on the books of the host enterprise.
Are there other alternatives to improve energy efficiency besides the energy-
performance contracting mechanism and EMCs? Two alternatives were considered:
line-of-credit and Demand-Side Management (DSM). Using a line-of-credit operation to
support industrial energy-conservation investments is simpler and easier. Because it is
not a market-oriented mechanism, the influence and result may not be very good
according to the past experiences (WB, 1998). DSM is a concept to promote electricity
conservation by electric-power utilities through consumer rebates or subsidies. DSM in
North America contributes to energy conservation. It is also a driver of the development
of ESCOs, as mentioned in Chapter 3. However, utilities in China view their business
as one of producing and supplying energy, rather than investing in the customers'
facilities to improve energy efficiency. Therefore, utilities have exhibited very little
interest or motivation towards energy-efficiency improvement, and they have limited
experience, capabilities, and staff resources for implementation of energy-efficiency
options. Moreover, the price bureaux of the municipal or provincial governments fix the
power price in China, so that the power price-regulation system is not conducive to
recovery of such costs through the power tariff. Therefore, the experiences of DSM in
the developed countries are not suitable for China's current situation. The reform in the
electricity-pricing system might provide a better incentive for energy efficiency.
WB/GEF China Energy Conservation Project Description
The WB/GEF China Energy Conservation Project was first prepared in 1995 and
was approved in 1998, with a US$63 million International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (IBRD) loan and US$22 million equivalent GEF grant. The project has
three project components: (1) EMC Demonstration, (2) Information Dissemination, and
(3) Program Management and Monitoring. As the core component, three EMCs, in
Liaoning Province, Shandong Province, and Beijing Municipality, as well as a not-for-
profit Energy Conservation Information Dissemination Center (SECIDC), have been
established to introduce and develop energy-performance contracting. This project is
executed by the Project Management Office (PMO) of the SETC. This whole project
involves four phases: (a) training and technical assistance on energy performance
contracting concepts, establishment of the EMCs, and initial project preparation (1996-
1997); (b) intensive training and technical assistance on EMC operations and
implementation of the first pilot projects by the EMCs (1997-1998); (c) implementation of
a wide variety of demonstration projects (1998-2000); and (d) EMC growth, through
replication of successful demonstration projects (1998-2003) (WB, 1998).
The three EMCs are for-profit, limited-liability, shareholding companies,
established and registered in 1996 according to China's Company Law with an initial
total share capital of 83 million RMB in addition to the loan and grant. Although the
company shareholders are public entities or publicly owned corporations, the EMCs are
autonomous from the government, with independent accounting, independent
management, and sole responsibility for their profits and losses.
Each of the three EMCs is developing its project lines in accordance with the
conditions in its regions and its particular staff expertise, but their early projects all
include installation of energy-efficient lighting in commercial and public buildings,
installation of energy-efficient electric motor systems, and renovation of small and
medium-size coal-fired boilers. Compared to ESCOs in Canada and the United States,
the Chinese EMCs have a greater focus on industrial applications. The average project
investment cost during the initial years is expected to be about 1.6 million RMB
(US$192,771), rising to about 2.6 million RMB (US$313,253) in later years (WB, 1998,
p. 27). The project expected energy savings and reduction of carbon dioxide (CO2)
emissions from direct investments of the EMCs are shown in Table 4-1.
Table 4-1
Expected Energy Savings and Reduction of CO2 Emissions, 1998-2006
Calendar Years Total
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Period
Energy Savings
(million tonnes of * 0.2 0.5 0.8 1.3 1.7 2.1 2.8 3.6 13.0
coal equivalent)
Carbon Reduction ** 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.9 1.2 1.5 1.9 2.5 9.2(million tonnes)
* 0.04
** 0.03
Source: WB, 1998. p. 18. Project Appraisal Document on a Proposal Loan in the Amount of US$63
Million and a Proposed GEF Grant of US$22 Million Equivalent to the People's Republic of China for an
Energy Conservation Project. Report No: 17030-CHA. Washington, DC: The World Bank.
China's EMCs are using the shared-savings model (the EMC as the borrower as
described in Chapter 3) to finance the projects. The three pilot EMCs can apply for
European Communities (EC), GEF or IBRD loans to conduct energy-efficiency projects
if the projects meet the following requirements: (a) are energy-conservation investments
(e.g., more than 50% of total project benefits accruing to the EMC must be derived from
savings in host-enterprise energy costs); (b) yield an estimated net financial rate of
return to the EMC of at least 15% per year; (c) employ the mechanism of the energy
performance contracting; and (d) be undertaken in stable and financially sound host
enterprises. In addition, for projects to be eligible for EC or GEF financing, each project
must have a distinct demonstration value: each project should demonstrate application
of the energy-performance-contracting mechanism in a new product line or
technological application, in a different type of host enterprise, or with a different type of
savings verification or contracting arrangement (WB, 1998).
China's EMCs Current Progress
The overall progress of EMCs' development in China has been satisfactory. As
of April 2002, the three EMCs had entered into 209 energy-performance contracts with
an aggregate investment of US$45.5 million (RMB 377.65 million). Of this total, $3.3
million was supported by the European Commission (EC) grant, $9.4 by the GEF grant,
$20.2 million by the IBRD loan and $12.6 million from internal and other financing. An
additional $6.2 million in projects had been approved and contracts were under
negotiation. Average annual rates of return of the EMC projects have exceeded 20%.
Repayments from EMC customers have been good-with very few exceptions,
payments have been made according to contract. All three EMCs declared net profits in
2001, and they plan to continue to expand their businesses. As of April 2002, EMC
investments had already delivered aggregate energy savings of 0.867 million tonnes of
coal equivalent (Mtce) and associated direct CO2 emission reductions of 0.577 million
tonnes of carbon (Mtc). Both energy savings and C02 emission reductions are certain
to continue to grow substantially, from both additional future savings from the equipment
already put in place, and from expected further major increases in investment (WB,
2002). Table 4-2 shows the summary of the three EMCs' progress.
Table 4-2
Three Pilot EMCs' Progress as of April 2002
Aggregate Investment US$45.5 million
Aggregate Projects Number 209
Aggregate Energy Savings 0.867 Mtce
Aggregate Direct C02 Emission Reductions 0.577 Mtc
Average Annual Rate of Return of EMC projects >20%
Mtce = million tonnes of coal equivalent
Mtc = million tonnes of carbon
Source: adapted from World Bank. 2002. Project Appraisal Document on A Proposed GEF
Grant of SDR 19.7 Million (US$26 Equivalent) to the People's Republic of China for the Second
Energy Conservation Project.
In addition, based on the successful business development of the three pilot
EMCs, many companies have shown substantial interest in creating new EMCs in
China. By the end of 2001, PMO had identified six newly formed EMCs, operating with
company staff of 20-30 each. Three of the companies had a registered capital of RMB
10 million (US$1.2million), while the other three had a registered capital of RMB 1.5-3.8
million (US$ 180,000-460,000). Aside from these companies, at least 200 companies
have shown strong interest and have begun to explore possibilities for creating EMCs
(WB, 2002).
Characteristics of the Chinese EMCs
Although Chinese EMCs are similar to ESCOs in the West in many aspects, they
have developed several unique characteristics over the past six years. The World Bank
(2002) cites the following characteristics:
(1) The three EMCs use the model of shared savings (the EMC as the borrower) to
finance their projects, although sometimes EMC customers may finance and
complete additional related renovation work themselves. The EMCs borrow
funds for their operations based on the strength of their balance sheet. Host
enterprises do not have the obligation to pay the loans. As it offers a clear
alternative to debt on the balance sheet, especially since payments to the EMCs
in some cases can be designated as operating costs, this model has proven very
attractive to host enterprises and is still expected to be the best means to meet
market demand.
(2) The EMC projects typically incorporate project design, equipment financing,
equipment procurement, equipment installation, commissioning and testing, and
limited maintenance. Financing, procurement, installation and
testing/commissioning are the core ingredients of all projects. Design work
usually also involves the host-enterprise staff.
(3) The EMC projects usually have a relatively narrow scope and are designed to
focus on one technology or system. Therefore, detailed facility audits are not
necessary and the constraint of audit costs or project-development costs are not
as critical an issue with the Chinese EMCs as with the Western ESCOs.
(4) The EMC projects are truly energy-conservation projects-cash flow resulting
from energy savings is the main benefit. Project sizes are usually in the
$200,000-$500,000 range. Contract terms are generally 2-3 years. Industry-
sector customers are the EMCs' major customers, with a 70% share. Coal-
saving projects are an important part of EMC projects. Figures 4-1 and 4-2 show
the EMC client's mix and EMC project-line breakdown. Compared to Figure 3-3,
we see that China's EMC client's mix is very different from U.S. ESCOs whose
customers are mainly in the institutional sector.
Source: World Bank. 2002. Project Appraisal Document on A Proposed GEF
Grant of SDR 19.7 Million (US$26 Equivalent) to the People's Republic of China
for the Second Energy Conservation Project, p.82.
Figure 4-1
EMC Clients' Mix
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Figure 4-2
EMC Project-Line Breakdown
Hotels/
Residential Resorts
Buildings 3%
4%
Office/Commer-cial I
Buildings Other
5% 2%
Utilities
16%
W d dustry70%
(5) Technology and equipment is primarily domestic. Foreign companies generally
cannot compete on price with Chinese manufacturers, and many of the projects
are too small to attract international suppliers.
(6) Energy-performance contracts between EMCs and clients have been significantly
simpler than typical ESCO contracts in the West. Project design and energy-
savings estimates are reviewed and agreed to by both parties. Payment
schedules are negotiated and fixed in the contracts, based on a percentage
share of the estimated energy-cost savings of the project that will accrue to the
EMC (generally 60-100%). Energy-savings guarantee clauses are included,
stipulating how payments will change if actual savings per unit of output or time
period are determined through testing to be substantially (e.g., 5-10%) higher or
lower than estimated. Testing is simple, and most of the energy savings are, in
fact, stipulated after commissioning. There have been virtually no disagreements
about savings and payment levels-as long as the equipment performs as
planned, the payment schedules established in the contracts are retained. There
has been no demand from host enterprises for in-depth or complex energy-
savings monitoring and verification.
(7) For the EMCs, the most important single criterion for project selection is the
financial assessment of the host enterprise, and the EMCs' evaluation of the
enterprises' willingness and ability to make payments. Some form of financial
guarantee/definition of collateral is often included in the energy-performance
contracts. Therefore, financial management of the EMCs' project portfolio and
associated risks is a major part of the EMC business.
These characteristics are expected to remain during the EMCs' development in
the near future. Although ESCOs may have different tracks in each country because of
the different backgrounds and environments, some common factors influence their
development, and China can learn lessons from other countries. I will discuss this more
through an international comparison in Chapter 6.
CHAPTER 5
IMPROVING ENERGY EFFICIENCY
IN COAL-RELATED INDUSTRIES: CASE STUDIES
As China's major energy resource, coal comprises 75% of the total energy
production and consumption in recent years (PMO, 1999). Two coal-related industries,
the cokemaking industry and the iron and steelmaking industry, are China's major
energy consumers and pollution producers. According to the 1999 National Coal
Balance Sheet, cokemaking is the second biggest consumer of coal in China. As much
as 149.42 million tonnes of coal was used in cokemaking, or 11.8% of the total national
consumption, to produce 120.74 million tonnes of coke. Except for the export, most of
coke is used in the iron and steel industry. The two industries consume around 26% of
the total industrial energy consumption in China (China Energy Statistical Yearbook
1997-1999, 2001). Thus, increasing the energy efficiency of these industries is an
important means of improving energy use and environmental protection in China. As
mentioned in Chapter 4, coal-related industries in China are EMCs' important clients. In
this chapter, I use two case studies to illustrate the potential to improve energy
efficiency in cokemaking and in the iron and steelmaking industries and to show how
EMCs can play a role in it.
Potential to Improve Energy Efficiency in Coal-Related Industries
In the past two decades, with its dynamic economic development, China has
experienced a rapid growth of coke, iron, and steel production. China is the largest
coke producer and exporter in the world, producing 120.73 million tonnes and exporting
9.97 million tonnes of coke in 1999 (LBNL, 2001). However, the average energy
consumption of each sector is much higher than the advanced international level, and
there is a great potential to improve its energy efficiency.
The Chinese cokemaking industry is energy inefficient because of the small-
scale technologies for coal utilization, waste of high-quality coking coal, and low
recovery of by-products and heat. Energy efficiency and pollution reduction in the
cokemaking industry in China can be greatly improved by updating the current
technologies and by improving waste recovery. For example, the energy efficiency
varies widely, depending on the type of oven used. The amount of coal required to
produce 1 tonne of coke, varies from 1.9 tonnes, using indigenous, low-technology
processes, to 1.4 using small mechanical machinery, to 1.3 using large mechanical
machinery (Polenske, 2001). Most Chinese cokemaking plants in Shanxi Province
require 1.3-1.4 tonnes (AGS 2000 Survey), while the modern Japanese cokemaking
facilities require only 1.1 tonnes of coal to produce high-grade coke. In addition, the
coke oven gas (COG) of many cokemaking plants in Shanxi Province is burnt in the air
instead of being recovered, which is not only a waste of energy, but also contributes to
CO2 emissions and air pollution (Zhang, 2002). The recovery of the waste heat will
greatly improve energy savings in the cokemaking industry.
Although it is the world's largest steel producer, China's energy-efficiency level is
far behind other main producers. Figure 5-1 compares the steelmaking energy
intensities for eight of the world's largest steel-producing countries. It shows a general
downward trend in most countries between 1971 and 1996. Iron and steel production is
the least energy-intensive in South Korea, Germany, Japan, and France, and most
energy-intensive in China (Price et al., 1997; Price et al., 2002). Table 5-1 shows
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Source: Ernst Worrell, Nathan Martin, and Lynn Price. 1999."Energy Efficiency and Carbon Dioxide
Emissions Reduction Opportunities in the U.S. Iron and Steel Sector." p. 4.
http://eetd.lbl.qov/ea/ies/iespubs/41724.pdf and L. Price, J. Sinton, E. Worrell, D. Phylipsen, X. Hu,
J. Li. 2002. "Energy use and carbon dioxide emissions from steel production in China." Energy 27(2002) p. 440.
Note: the energy-intensity data are the aggregate values for both the primary steel production (using
blast furnace and basic oxygen furnace) and the secondary steel production (using electric arc
furnace). Because the primary steel production is much more energy-intensive than the secondary
steel production, this aggregation ignores the significant difference in energy intensity of the two
production methods. However, disaggregated data for these two types of steel production are not
available.
Figure 5-1
Steel-Production Energy Intensity, Selected Countries, 1971-1996
estimates of the potential energy savings and C02 savings for steelmaking in key
developing countries, comparing the 1995 situation relative to the "best-practice"
technologies. Again, China ranks highest in regard to the current energy intensity and
potential for improvement. Around 45% of the energy used would be saved if best-
practice technologies were used in China; consequently, C02 emissions would be
reduced by more than 50%. The potential improvements in China's steelmaking include
waste-heat recovery, continuous casting, fuel-gas recovery, industrial boilers and
furnaces, and scrap processing (Worrell et al., 1997).
Table 5-1
Potential Steelmaking Energy Savings and CO2 Savings,
Key Developing Countries, 1995
Country Actual Primary Best Practice Technical Potential Potential
Energy Intensity Primary Energy Primary Energy Improvement (%)
in 1995 Intensity (GJ/tonne) Savings (GJ/tonne)
(GJ/tonne)
China 36.7 20.2 16.5 45.0%
India 37.3 20.5 16.8 45.0%
Brazil 23.1 18.6 4.5 19.5%
Mexico 22.6 13.5 9.1 40.3%
Country Actual CO2  Best Practice CO2 Technical Potential Potential
Intensity in 1995 Intensity (tC/tonne) CO2 Savings Improvement (%)(tC/tonne) (tC/tonne)
China 0.87 0.48 0.39 44.8%
India 0.98 0.53 0.45 45.9%
Brazil 0.36 0.27 0.09 25.0%
Mexico 0.42 0.24 0.18 42.9%
Source: adapted from Lynn Price, Ernst Worrell, and Dian Phylipsen, 1999, "Energy Use and
Carbon Dioxide Emissions in Energy-Intensive Industries in Key Developing Countries"
http://eetd.lbl.qov/ea/IES/iespubs/45292.pdf and L. Price, J. Sinton, E. Worrell, D. Phylipsen, X.
Hu, J. Li, 2002, "Energy use and carbon dioxide emissions from steel production in China,"
Energy 27 (2002), p. 440.
Because waste-heat recovery can significantly improve energy efficiency in both
the cokemaking and the iron and steelmaking industries, I select these two cases in this
chapter to study the potential to promote energy-efficiency projects and the role that
EMCs can play.
Measuring Project Viability
Before analyzing the two projects, I consider measures of project viability.
Cost/benefit analysis is a commonly used approach. Cost/benefit analysis can be
conducted using a simple payback analysis or a more sophisticated analysis, such as
discounted cash flow (DCF) analysis and weighted social impacts analysis.
A highly simplified form of cost/benefit analysis is called "simple payback." In this
method, the total initial investment is divided by the first-year energy-cost savings
resulting from the investment. This method provides the number of years required for
the improvement to pay for itself. Although this method is very easy to understand and
conduct, it does not consider a number of factors that can have a significant impact on
cost savings. These factors may be considered by using the DCF analysis. Because
the main purpose of energy-efficiency projects is to reduce energy costs and the DCF
analysis focuses on the cost effectiveness of the project over its lifetime, some analysts
also call this method life-cycle cost (LCC) analysis.
An analyst uses the DCF method to conduct a comprehensive assessment of
anticipated costs associated with a project over its lifetime. Factors commonly
considered include initial capital costs, operating and maintenance costs, financing
costs, the expected useful life of equipment, and future equipment salvage values. The
result of the DCF analysis is generally represented as the net present value (NPV) of
the project as reflected by an appropriate discount rate. In addition, an internal rate of
return (IRR) and discounted payback period are often used to evaluate the profitability
of a project.
Some factors, such as reduced carbon emissions, and improved indoor air
quality, are not considered in either simple payback or DCF analyses. In order to value
the economic cost/benefit of a project from a more comprehensive perspective, an
analyst may use the method of weighing social impacts, which is designed to assign an
appropriate monetary value to these ancillary benefits and include them in savings
calculations.
I use the above three methods to measure project viability in the following two
case studies.
Case One: Project of Using Waste Coal Gas to Substitute for Heavy Oil
Introduction
Case one is a project conducted in 1999 as an EMC pilot project in Shandong
Province. 4 The main content of the project was to recover the residue Blast-Furnace
(BF) gas and coke-oven gas (COG) and use them in the heating furnace of the special
steel plant to substitute for the current fuel, heavy oil. The EMC is one of the three pilot
EMCs and the host enterprise (below called Company A) is a large iron and steel
production enterprise with "AAA" financial credit (the highest credit rating). Company A
is a publicly traded company and the basic production and financial information from
1996 to 1998 is as follows:
Table 5-2
Case One: Company A's Basic Production and Financial Information, 1996-1998
1996 1997 1998
Steel (million tonnes) 1.38 1.66 1.89
Net Income (million RMB) 102.88 279.14 276.79
Total Assets (million RMB) 6,461.03 8,113.53 9,254.91
Debt Ratio (%) 68.87 63.07 68.44
Source: adapted from the CECIC report
Project Rationale
Company A is a large energy consumer. Its annual energy consumption is 1.8
million tonnes coal equivalent (tce). There is a big potential to increase energy
efficiency and energy utilization. For example, the BF gas and COG are not effectively
recovered. This project is to recycle BF gas and COG and use them as heavy oil
4 This case is based on the information from an evaluation report of this pilot EMC project. The
evaluation was conducted by China Energy Conservation Investment Company (CECIC). Assumptions
are made by the author due to lack of detailed information.
substitutes, thus increasing energy utilization and lowering the company's production
cost.
The heavy oil annual consumption in Company A is about 30,000 tonnes and the
overall thermal capacity is 1,155*109 KJ (Kilojoules). The excess BF gas is 62,400 m3/h
(cubic meters per hour) and the excess COG is 9,400 m3/h in Company A. If we mix
COG and BF gas at the ratio 1:2, we can get 28,200 m3/h of mixed gas and 8,127 KJ/m 3
of the calorific power. The average annual operating time of the heating furnace in the
casting system in Company A is 7,128 hours. With the substitution factor of the heavy
oil and the mixed gas being 1.25, we can compute that to substitute the heavy oil with
the mixed gas in the heating furnace, the required amount of mixed gas is:
1,155*109 KJ / 7,128h * 1.25 / 8,127 KJ/m 3= 24,922 m3/h.
This is only 88% of the total excess mixed gas we can get (28,200 m3/h). Therefore, the
mixed gas can meet the substitution requirement.
Content of the Project
This project was to substitute the residue BF gas and COG for the heavy oil,
being used in the heating furnace of the special steel plant. There were five furnaces in
the casting system in Company A's special steel plant. The project conducted by the
EMC focused on the #2 heating furnace. The renovation of the other four furnaces was
conducted by Company A itself with its own financing. The total expected substitution
was 30,000 tonnes of heavy oil and 1,500 tonnes of diesel oil.
The main construction of the project included:
1) Construction of a new mixed coal-gas pipe line between the coal-gas pressure
station and the special steel plant. The main pipe has a diameter of 1.2 m and a
length of 3,700m. The other three minor pipes have a diameter (length) 0.9 m
(0.1 m), 0.6 m (0.3m), and 0.3m (1rn), respectively.
2) Renovation of the #2 heating furnace to change the fuel from heavy oil to mixed
gas.
3) Renovation of the power control of the mixed gas pressure station to meet the
requirement of the large amount of the mixed gas output.
4) Renovation of the other four furnaces to use mixed gas as the fuel.
Project Financing
The #2 heating furnace renovation was financed by EMC with an investment of
9.606 million RMB. As it was a pilot EMC project supported by the WB, the EMC
obtained a 2.71 million RMB loan and a 3.28 million RMB grant from the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), or a total of 5.99 million RMB.
Following this renovation, Company A renovated the other four furnaces financed by its
own fund of 5 million RMB. The breakdowns of the project financing and spending
structures are shown in Tables 5-3 and 5-4.
Table 5-3
Case One: Project-Financing Structure
Source Amount Percent
(million RMB) (%)
IBRD Grant 3.280 22.5
IBRD Bank Loan 2.710 18.6
EMC Equity 3.616 24.8
Company A Equity 5.000 34.2
Total 14.606 *100.0
*Numbers do not add to total due to rounding.
Source: adapted from the CECIC report
Equipment, Construction, and Inst
Design and others
Renovation on the other four furna
Total
*Numbers do not add to total due to
Source: adapted from the CECIC r
Table 5-4
Case One: Project-Spending Structure
Amount
(million RMB)
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1.306
ces 5.000
14.606
rounding.
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Cost/Benefit Analysis
Before evaluating the overall costs and benefits of the project, I first analyze the
annual economic, energy, and environmental benefits from the renovation. According
to the assumptions in Table 5-5, we can calculate that the annual fuel costs before the
renovation are 30.27 million RMB5 and after the renovation are reduced to 22.38 million
RMB 6; therefore, the annual economic benefits (cost savings) from the renovation are
7.89 million RMB. Tables 5-6 and 5-7 show the annual energy benefits and
environmental benefits from the renovation respectively.
To evaluate the costs and benefits of the entire project, I use three cost-benefit
analysis methods (introduced in Chapter 3): simple payback, discounted cash flow
(DCF) analysis, and weighed social-impact method.
5 Heavy oil consumption*Heavy oil price + Vapor consumption*Vapor price.
6 Mixed gas consumption*Mixed gas price.
Percentage
56.8
8.9
34.2
*100.00
Table 5-5
Case One: Assumptions to Calculate the Economic Benefit from the Renovation
Before substitution
1 The annual heavy oil consumption: 30,000 tonnes
2 The annual total thermal capacity of heavy oil: 1,155*10 9 KJ
3 The price of heavy oil: 976 RMB/tonne
4 The annual vapor consumption used to heat heavy oil: 18,000 tonnes
5 The price of vapor: 55 RMB/tonne
Total Costs 30.27 million RMB
After substitution
1 The mixed gas ratio: coke oven gas/BF coal gas = 1/2
2 The mixed gas consumption: 24,922 m3/h
3 The average annual operating time of the heating furnace: 7,128 hours
4 The thermal capacity of the mixed gas: 8,127 KJ/m 3
5 The price of the mixed gas: 0.126 RMB/m 3
6 There is no vapor consumption
7 There is no change in operating costs.
Total Costs 22.38 million RMB
Cost Savings 7.89 million RMB
Source: the author
Table 5-6
Case One: Annual Energy Benefit from the Renovation
Energy Saving Unit: tonnes of coal equivalent (tce)
Heavy Oil 30,000
Diesel Oil 1,500
Vapor 18,000
Total 37,000
Source: adapted from the CECIC report
Table 5-7
Case One: Annual Environmental Benefit from the Renovation
Pollutant Reduction Unit: tonne
C02 98,494
S02 740
TSP 148
Source: adapted from the CECIC report
(1) Simple Payback Method
This method yields the number of years required for the improvement to pay for
itself. As the total initial investment is 14.606 million RMB and the annual energy-saving
benefit is 7.89 million RMB, the simple payback period is 1.85 years.
(2) Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) Analysis
I conduct a DCF analysis to assess the anticipated cost savings associated with
the project over its lifetime. The factors I considered include initial capital costs,
financing costs (e.g., interest), depreciation, tax effect, and the expected useful life of
equipment. In this case, the only bank loan was from the IBRD. As the London
InterBank Offered Rate (LIBOR) was 5.213% on December 1998
(http://www.fanniemae.com/tools/ibor/1 998.jhtml?p=Tools%20&%20Resources) and
IBRD's interest rate is usually 20-30 basis points (bp) higher than the LIBOR Rate, I
assume the interest rate in the project is 5.5%. For the tax effect, I use the corporate
income tax 33%. For the expected useful life of equipment, I use the project life term of
10 years, and I assume that there are no equipment salvage values after 10 years. I
also assume that the total capital investment is depreciated/amortized over the 11-year
project term (including one year for construction) using the straight-line method. In
addition, I assume the inflation rate is 0%, because the inflation rate in China in 1998
and 1999 was -0.8% and -1.4%, respectively
(http://www.adb.orq/Documents/Books/Key Indicators/2002/rtl 8.pdf), and China has
kept a very low inflation rate in recent years. I use 12% as the discount rate because
the basic internal rate of return in China is 12% (China's Agenda 21, n.d.), and the
baseline of the required annual rate of return for government projects is also 12%.7 For
simplicity, I assume the discount rate holds constant when the project financing
structure changes. Table 5-8 shows the detailed project assumptions and inputs.
I conduct two alternative calculations using discounted cash flow to look at the
project costs and benefits: one is without leverage (no debt financing) which reflects the
project's profitability irrespective of the way it is financed, the other is with the IBRD
grant and the current leverage that considers debt financing costs and the
7 Source: Jianyu He, an officer at State Development and Planning Commission (SDPC) interviewed by
Yabei Zhang, February 20, 2002.
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Table 5-8
Case One: Project Assumptions and Inputs
Values
of heavy oil substitution 30,000
e 976
vapor consumption 18,000
55
nsumption 177,644,016
ice 0.126
nual operating and 0(O&M) costs
avings* 7,886,854
Share of savings given to the EMC
Term of savings given to the EMC
Project life term
Equipment salvage value after the life
term**
Project construction term
Energy escalation rate**
Capital investment is depreciated equally
over 11 years**
85%
2
10
0
1
0%
Units
tonne/year
RMB/tonne
tonne/year
RMB/tonne
m 3
RMB/m 3
RMB
Years
Years
RMB
Year
Total investment 14,606,000 RMB
Debt ratio* 18.55%
Interest rate** 5.5%
Bank loan 2,709,413 RMB
Annual interest* 149,000 RMB
Debt-financing term 3 Years
IBRD grant 3,280,000 RMB
Tax rate 33%
Discount rate** 12%
Inflation rate** 0%
Source: the author
Notes: assumptions and inputs are from the project evaluation report except for
* numbers are calculated by the author
** assumptions are made by the author
corresponding tax effect. The two cash flows are shown in Tables 5-9 and 5-10 and
their cumulative present values are shown in Figure 5-2. The IBRD grant and loan
increase the cumulative present value substantially, which makes this project more
attractive.
To indicate how the values are calculated, I explain Table 5-9 in detail as follows.
The first line is the capital investment of 14,606 thousand RMB. I assume it will be
spent immediately, and there is no additional capital investment after that. The second
line is cost savings. Because the project has a one-year construction term, the cost
savings start at year 2, and I assume there is no change during the project life term.
The third line is depreciation. Because I assume the capital investment is depreciated
over 11 years using the straight-line method, the annual depreciation is
14,606/11=1,328 thousand RMB. The fourth line is taxable income, which is the
deduction of cost savings and depreciation. The fifth line is tax with the marginal tax
rate of 33%. Because the taxable income in year 1 is negative, there is no tax in year
one; instead, the taxable income loss is carried forward to year 2. Therefore, tax in year
2 is (6.559-1,328)*33%=1,726 thousand RMB. The sixth line is net cash flow, the
outcome of cash inflow minus cash outflow. In this case, the cash inflow is cost
savings, and the cash outflow is capital investment and the tax paid. The seventh line is
the present value (PV) of the net cash flow discounted by 12% (e.g., the PV in year-
3=5,722/(1+12%)3=4,073 thousand RMB). The cumulative PV in the eighth line is the
sum of PV of the corresponding years. The net present value (NPV) in the ninth line is
the sum of PV of the project life term (10 years) and the current capital investment (cash
outflow). The discounted payback period in line 10 is the year that is calculated to make
the cumulative PV in line 8 equal zero. In this case, the payback period
=1,985/(1262+1,985)+4=4.61years. The internal rate of return (IRR) in line 11 is the
discounted rate at which the project's NPV equals zero. It can be calculated through a
trial-and-error process or using the IRR formula in a spreadsheet software (e.g.,
EXCEL).
Table 5-9
Case One: Project Cash Flow without Debt Financing
(Thousand RMB)
Item Year
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1. Capital Investment 14,606
2. Cost Savings 0 7,887 7,887 7,887 7,887 7,887 7,887 7,887 7,887 7,887 7,887
3. Depreciation 1,328 1,328 1,328 1,328 1,328 1,328 1,328 1,328 1,328 1,328 1,328
4. Taxable Income (2-3) -1,328 6,559 6,559 6,559 6,559 6,559 6,559 6,559 6,559 6,559 6,559
5. Tax at 33% 0 1,726 2,164 2,164 2,164 2,164 2,164 2,164 2,164 2,164 2,164
6. Net Cash Flow (2-1-5) -14,606 0 6,161 5,722 5,722 5,722 5,722 5,722 5,722 5,722 5,722 5,722
7. PV at 12% -14,606 0 4,911 4,073 3,637 3,247 2,899 2,589 2,311 2,064 1,842 1,645
8. Currulative PV -14,606 -14,606 -9,695 -5,622 -1,985 1,262 4,161 6,750 9,061 11,124 12,967 14,612
9. NPV 14,612
10. Payback Period (years) 4.61
11. IRR 29%
Source: the author
Note: the taxable income loss can be carried forward to the next year.
Table 5-10
Case One: Project Cash Flow with the IBRD Grant and Debt Financing
(Thousand RMB)
Item Year
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1. Capital Investment 14,606
2. Cost Savings 0 7,887 7,887 7,887 7,887 7,887 7,887 7,887 7,887 7,887 7,887
3. Depreciation 1,328 1,328 1,328 1,328 1,328 1,328 1,328 1,328 1,328 1,328 1,328
4. Interest at 5.5% 149 149 149 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
5. Taxable Income
(2-3-4) -1,477 6,410 6,410 6,559 6,559 6,559 6,559 6,559 6,559 6,559 6,559
6. Tax at 33% 0 1,628 2,115 2,164 2,164 2,164 2,164 2,164 2,164 2,164 2,164
7. Cash Flow from
Debt Financing 2,709 -2,709
8. Cash Flow from
IBRD Grant 3,280
9. Net Cash Flow
(2-1-4-6+7+8) -8,617 -149 6,110 2,913 5,722 5,722 5,722 5,722 5,722 5,722 5,722 5,722
10. PV at 12% -8,617 -133 4,871 2,073 3,637 3,247 2,899 2,589 2,311 2,064 1,842 1,645
11. Cumulative PV -8,617 -8,750 -3,879 -1,805 1,831 5,078 7,977 10,566 12,877 14,941 16,783 18,428
12. NPV 18,428
13. Payback Period
(years) 3.50
14. IRR 41%
Source: the author
Note: the taxable income loss can be carried forward to the next year.
In Table 5-10, because this is the alternative with debt financing and the IBRD
grant, the cash inflow includes the debt and grant in year 0 and the cash outflow of
interest payments in the first three years (the debt-financing term is three years) and the
principal payment in year 3.
Case One: Cumulative Present Value
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Figure 5-2
Case One: Cumulative Present Value
This project was conducted based on energy-performance contracting. The
EMC helped the project with its energy audit and financing; the project design and
construction were outsourced to a design institute and construction company.
As Company A had a relatively high technical capability, the project operation and
technical training were conducted by Company A itself. According to the performance
contract, the EMC would obtain 85% of the energy-saving benefits for the first two
years, or 6.7 million RMB per year. The rest of the energy-saving benefits and the
equipment would belong to Company A. The EMC's cash flow and Company A's cash
flow of this project are shown in Tables 5-11 and 5-12.
In Table 5-11, the capital investment from the EMC side is 9,606 thousand RMB,
and I assume it is depreciated using the straight-line method over the contract term of
three years with Company A. Because the negotiated share of savings given to the
EMC is 85% and the term is two years, the EMC has cash inflow of 6,704 thousand
RMB (7,887*85%) in year 2 and 3 from Company A (the second line in Table 5-11).
Correspondingly, Company A has cash outflow to the EMC in the third line of Table 5-
12. Because the EMC obtained the IBRD grant and loan for the project, the EMC has
the cash inflow from the IBRD grant and loan in year 0 and the cash outflow of interest
payments in the first three years (149 thousand RMB per year) and the principal
payment in year 3. Comparing Table 5-12 with Table 5-9, we see that Company A has
a much higher NPV through the EMC financing than from conducting and financing the
project by itself.
Table 5-11
Case One: EMC's Cash Flow
(Thousand RMB)
Item Year
0 1 2 3
1. Capital Investment 9,606
2. Cost Savings from Company A 0 6,704 6,704
3. Depreciation 3,202 3,202 3,202
4. Interest at 5.5% 149 149 149
5.Taxable Income (2-3-4) -3,351 3,353 3,353
6. Tax at 33% 0 1 1,106
7. Cash Flow from Debt Financing 2,709 -2,709
8. Cash Flow from IBRD Grant 3,280
9. Net Cash Flow (2-1-4-6+7+8) -3,617 -149 6,554 2,739
10. PV at 12% -3,617 -133 5,225 1,950
11. Cumulative PV -3,617 -3,750 1,475 3,425
12. NPV 3,425
13. Payback Period (years) 1.72
14. IRR 50%
Source: the author
Note: the taxable income loss can be carried forward to the next year.
Table 5-12
Case One: Company A's Cash Flow
(Thousand RMB)
Item Year
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1. Capital Investment 5,000
2. Cost Savings 0 7,887 7,887 7,887 7,887 7,887 7,887 7,887 7,887 7,887 7,887
3. Cost Savings Paid
to EMC 0 6,704 6,704 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4. Depreciation 455 455 455 455 455 455 455 455 455 455 455
5. Taxable Income
(2-3-4) -455 728 728 7,432 7,432 7,432 7,432 7,432 7,432 7,432 7,432
6. Tax at 33% 0 90 240 2,453 2,453 2,453 2,453 2,453 2,453 2,453 2,453
7. Net Cash Flow
(2-1-3-6) -5,000 0 1,093 943 5,434 5,434 5,434 5,434 5,434 5,434 5,434 5,434
8. PV at 12% -5,000 0 871 671 3,454 3,084 2,753 2,458 2,195 1,960 1,750 1,562
9. Cumulative PV -5,000 -5,000 -4,129 -3,458 -5 3,079 5,832 8,290 10,485 12,445 14,194 15,757
10. NPV 15,757
11. Payback Period
(years) 4.00
12. IRR 43%
Source: the author
Note: the taxable income loss can be carried forward to the next year.
(3) Weighted Social-Impact Method
Energy-efficiency projects not only have noticeable economic benefits but also
have substantial social benefits from the pollution reduction associated with reduced
energy use. As shown in Table 5-7, this project will reduce the emissions of C02 by
98,494 tonnes, SO2 by 740 tonnes, and TSP by 148 tonnes annually. If we assign the
money value to these social benefits, we can get the project benefits from the whole
society perspective. However, to quantify the social benefits from pollution reduction is
very hard, and it strongly depends on the local factors. Here, I refer to a quantitative
study result of C02 reduction's social benefits in Shanghai. According to this study
initiated by the U.S. EPA (Leggett and Shelby, 2002), the estimated reductions in C02
emissions in Shanghai from the present to 2010 are 9-47 million tons, and the estimated
social benefit is $113-950 million; therefore, the estimated benefit per ton C02 reduced
is $13-20 (119 -183 RMB/tonne). I use the lower bound (119 RMB/tonne) to estimate
the social benefits of the project, because the economy in Shandong Province is less
developed than Shanghai's, and I assume the unit social benefit in Shandong is less
than in Shanghai. The project cash flow with the weighted social impacts is shown in
Table 5-13. By comparing Tables 5-13 and 5-10, we can see that this energy-efficiency
project has very significant social benefits. The NPV, payback period, and IRR are
significantly improved: 321% (from 18,428 to 77,558), 54% (from 3.50 to 1.62), and
143% (from 41 % to 98%), respectively. Therefore, the society should encourage
undertaking this kind of energy-efficiency project.
Table 5-13
Case One: Project Cash Flow with Weighed Social Impacts
(Thousand RMB)
Item Year
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1. Capital Investment 14,606
2. Cost Savings 0 7,887 7,887 7,887 7,887 7,887 7,887 7,887 7,887 7,887 7,887
3. Depreciation 1,328 1,328 1,328 1,328 1,328 1,328 1,328 1,328 1,328 1,328 1,328
4. Interest at 5.5% 149 149 149
5. Taxable Income
(2-4) -1,477 6,410 6,410 6,559 6,559 6,559 6,559 6,559 6,559 6,559 6,559
6. Tax at 33% 0 1,628 2,115 2,164 2,164 2,164 2,164 2,164 2,164 2,164 2,164
7. Social Benefits
from CO2 Reduction 0 11,721 11,721 11,721 11,721 11,721 11,721 11,721 11,721 11,721 11,721
8. Cash Flow from
Debt Financing 2,709 -2,709
9. Cash Flow from the
IBRD Grant 3,280
10. Net Cash Flow
(2-1-4-6+7+8+9) -8,617 -149 17,831 14,634 17,443 17,443 17,443 17,443 17,443 17,443 17,443 17,443
9. PV at 12% -8,617 -133 14,215 10,416 11,085 9,898 8,837 7,890 7,045 6,290 5,616 5,014
10. Cumulative PV -8,617 -8,750 5,465 15,881 26,966 36,864 45,701 53,592 60,637 66,927 72,543 77,558
11. NPV 77,558
12. Payback Period
(years) 1.62
13. IRR 98%
Source: the author
Note:
1. The taxable income loss can be carried forward to the next year.
2. Annual social benefits from CO2 reduction = 119*98,494 = 11,721 thousand RMB
Table 5-14 summarizes the main results of the cost-benefit analysis for Case
One.
Table 5-14
Case One: Main Results of Cost-Benefit Analysis
NPV (12%) Payback
(million RMB) Period
(years)
Simple Payback Method N.A. 1.85
Without Leverage 14.61 4.61
DCF With IBRD Grant and Debt 18.43 3.50
Analysis FinancingEMC 3.43 1.72
Company A 15.76 4.00
Weighting Social Impact Method 77.56 1.62
Source: the author
N.A.: Not Applicable
IRR
(percent)
N.A.
29
41
50
43
98
Sensitivity Analysis
The above cost-benefit analysis shows the project feasibility from the
perspective of the EMC, Company A, and the whole project itself under specific
assumptions indicated in Table 5-8. Note that several factors may have considerable
impacts on the cost-benefit-analysis results.
(1) Heavy-Oil Price
As the project is to recover the waste gas to substitute for the fuel, heavy oil, the
changes in the heavy-oil price directly influence the energy-cost savings. Figure 5-3
shows how the price fluctuated during 1994-1997, ranging from 901.33 RMB/tonne to
1479.81 RMB/tonne. Especially, there was a noticeable peak in the middle of 1995.
The reason for this peak related to a number of complex factors that are beyond the
scope of this study. The negotiated heavy-oil price between Company A and the EMC
in this case in 1999 was 976 RMB/tonne. Figure 5-4 shows the sensitivity of the project
NPV with 18.55% debt financing to the heavy-oil price. We can see that the NPV is
I
very sensitive to the heavy-oil price: every one RMB increase in the unit heavy-oil price
results in 0.101 million RMB increase in the NPV. If the price increases to 1500
RMB/tonne, the project NPV will be 3.88 times the current one. Therefore, this energy-
efficiency project is a great way to hedge the risk of heavy-oil price increases.
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Figure 5-3
Heavy-Oil Price: 1994-1997
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Figure 5-4
Case One NPV: Sensitivity to Heavy-Oil Price Changes
(2) Tax
As both the loan interest and depreciation have a tax-shield effect, I next
consider how the corporate income tax influences the project cash flow. Figure 5-5
shows the project NPV's sensitivity to the tax rate: every 1% decrease in corporate
income tax rate results in 0.318 million RMB increase in the NPV. Therefore, the tax
incentives can effectively influence project attractiveness.
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Figure 5-5
Case One NPV: Sensitivity to Corporate Income-Tax Rate Changes
(3) Interest Rate
The interest rate on the debt may also significantly influence the project
economics. In this case, with the leverage of 18.55%, the NPV's sensitivity to the
interest rate is shown in Figure 5-6. Every 1% increase in interest rate results in a 0.04
million RMB decrease in the NPV. We can see that the NPV is not as sensitive to
interest rates as to heavy-oil price and the tax rate in this case. This directly relates to
the project-financing structure: the project has a very low leverage, only 18.55% and
only a three-year period. If the debt financing is the major financing source, the interest
rate will be a significant factor.
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Figure 5-6
Case One NPV: Sensitivity to Interest-Rate Changes
Case Two: Project of Using Waste Coal Gas to Generate Electricity
Introduction
Case two is a project conducted ir
Company B) in Shanxi Province. The m
plant to recover the excess BF gas and c
industrial group, mainly producing coke.
smelting plant. The annual metallurgical
1997 by a cokemaking company itself (called
ain content of the project was to build a power
oke oven gas (COG). Company B is a large
It has four cokemaking plants and one
coke production was 1 million tonnes and pig
8 This case is based on the information from an interview with the company's manager conducted by the
author during a field trip in July 2002. Assumptions are made by the author due to lack of detailed
information.
iron production was 0.15 million tonnes. Company B just went public in 2002 and the
basic financial information from 2000 to 2002 is as follows:
Table 5-15
Case Two: Company B's Basic Financial Information, 2000-2002
2000 2001 2002
Net Income (million RMB) 38.26 40.74 47.42
Total Assets (million RMB) N.A. 717.87 868.62
Debt Ratio (%) N.A. 67.82 67.88
Source: the author
*The published 2000 Balance Sheet (BS) is identical with 2002 BS. The author assumes that
the BS information in 2000 is not right.
Project Rationale
Both the cokemaking plants and the smelting plant of Company B generate a
large amount of excess gas, such as COG and BF gas. These excess gases can be
recovered in three ways:
(1) Using them as town gas and industrial gas is the first choice. Town gas provides a
clean fuel for residential energy demand. However, there are several constraints
that limit the use of it: (a) low demand in the rural area; (b) extra cleaning cost for
residential use; (c) high cost to build pipelines to transport gas and tanks to store the
gas, especially in Shanxi rural areas where residents live far from each other, which
makes building the pipelines costly; and (d) no price advantage over liquid natural
gas. Compared to buying cheap coal, it is not economic to transport the COG and
BF gas to remote plants in Shanxi Province. (Chen 2000)
(2) Transforming COG and BF gas to heat for transmission is another alternative. Heat
can be in the form of hot water for residential use, and steam or just high-
temperature gas for industrial use. However, it still has the following problems: (a)
low and unstable demand in many areas, (b) additional cost of building boilers and
cleaning the flue gas, and (c) high cost of pipes if user location is far away from the
cokemaking plant. (Chen 2000)
(3) Transforming COG and BF gas into electricity that can be used cleanly and
transmitted over a long distance provides the flexibility for it to be used in a wide
variety of cases and anywhere in the electricity network. Company B is a
comprehensive industrial group that has a high demand for electricity. Its annual
electricity expense is over 10 million RMB. It is an ideal choice to use the excess
coal gas to generate power and to use it internally to reduce the high electricity bill.
In addition, use of the excess COG and BF gas can effectively reduce greenhouse
gas emissions and other pollutants. In many cases, these excess coal gases are
just burned, which is very polluting and a waste of energy.
Project Description
The power plant was built in 1997 and started operating in 1998. The total
investment of the project was 46 million RMB. The project financing sources are shown
in Table 5-16. Note that the 30 million RMB loan from China Construction Bank was
from the central government special funds with a very low interest rate around 2%. As
mentioned in Chapter 2, the government established some special funding programs to
promote environmentally friendly and technically advanced projects. These funds were
usually managed and implemented by the State-owned banks. However, the special
funding programs were cut after 1997 due to China's accelerated transition from a
planned economy to a market economy. Company B was fortunate to obtain the
special loan to conduct this project in 1997. The term of the loan was one year.
Table 5-16
The Project Financing Structure in Case Two
Source Amount Percentage
(million RMB) (%)
China Construction Bank Loan 30 65.2
Equity Financing 16 34.8
Total 46 100.0
Source: the author
The whole area of the power plant is 33,000 M2 , including 12,000 m2 building
area and 11,300 m2 green area. The main equipment includes: two coal gas boilers,
two steamers, and two electric generators. The whole construction and installation
period was one year. The capacity of the power plant is 2*3000 KW (Kilowatt). The
annual power generation is 42 million KWh (Kilowatt hours) with the by-product of
120,000 tonnes of vapor. The annual gas consumption is BF gas-192.24 million m3 and
COG-38.14 million M3.
Cost/Benefit Analysis
I follow the structure of Case One to do the cost/benefit analysis. I first analyze
the annual economic, energy, and environmental benefits from the power-plant project.
According to the assumptions in Table 5-17, I calculate that the annual economic
benefits (cost savings) from this project are 14.94 million RMB. I assume the COG and
BF gas costs are zero, because many cokemaking plants in Shanxi Province just burn
the excess coal gases in the air if they cannot recover them, and I assume they are not
charged environmental fees to burn the coal gases in the air. I assume the vapor price
is 30 RMB/tonne, which is lower than Case One's price because of the differences
between locations and selling and buying prices.
Table 5-17
Case Two: Assumptions to Calculate the Economic Benefit of
the Power-Plant Project
Before the Power-Plan Project
1 Annual power demand: 42 million Kwh
2 Electricity price: 0.32 RMB/Kwh
3 Annual vapor demand: 120,000 tonne
4 Vapor Price: 30 RMB/tonne
Total Costs 17.04 million RMB
After the Power-Plant Project
1 Operation & Maintenance (O&M) cost: 0.05 RMB/Kwh
2 Annual BF Gas consumption: 192.24 million m3
3 Annual COG consumption: 38.14 million m3
4 COG & BF gas cost: 0 RMB/m 3
Total Costs 2.1 million RMB
Cost Savings 14.94 million RMB
Source: the author
This power plant annually consumed BF gas 192.24 million m3 and COG 38.14
million M3, which would be probably burned otherwise. Consequently, it avoided buying
42 million KWh electricity annually, which would be generated by the electricity utility
otherwise. For the environmental benefit, because of the lack of direct information, I
refer to the electricity to C02'S conversion factor from the Energy Saving Trust: one
KWh electricity generation will cause 0.46 kg C02 emission
(http://www.est.orq. uk/housing/begin gues4.cfm). Therefore, the annual environmental
benefit from the project is the reduction of 19,320 tonnes C02 emission. The analysis of
other pollution reduction needs further information, so I do not include them here.
(1) Simple Payback Method
As the total initial investment is 46 million RMB and the annual cost savings are
14.94 million RMB, the simple payback period is 3.08 years.
(2) DCF Analysis
Following Case One's DCF analysis structure, I list the detailed project
assumptions and inputs in Table 5-18; then, I conduct two sets of calculations to look at
the project economics: without leverage and with current leverage. Tables 5-19 and 5-
20 contain the results for the project cash flows, and Figure 5-7 shows their cumulative
present values. Although the project has a high debt ratio of 65.2%, the interest rate is
very low and the loan term is only one year; therefore, there is still no significant
difference in NPV between the two alternatives.
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Figure 5-7
Case Two: Cumulative Present Value
Inputs
Annual power generat
Electricity price
Annual vapor generat
Vapor price**
Annual BF gas consu
Annual COG consum;
COG & BF gas cost**
O&M
Annual O&M cost*
Annual cost savings*
Table 5-18
Case Two: Project Assumptions and Inputs
Values
ion 42
0.32
ion 120,000
30
mption 192.24
ption 38.14
0
0.05
2,100 T
14.94
Units
Million Kwh
RMB/Kwh
Tonne
RMB/tonne
Million m3
Million m3
RMB/ m3
RMB/Kwh
iousand RMB
Million RMB
Power plant life term
Equipment salvage value after the life
term**
Project construction term
Energy escalation rate**
Capital investment is depreciated equally
over 21 years**
Total investment
Equity financing
Debt financing
Debt ratio*
Interest rate**
Debt financing term
Tax rate
Discount rate**
Inflation rate**
Years
RMB
Year1
0%
46
16
30
65%
2%
1
33%
12%
0%
Million RMB
Million RMB
Million RMB
Year
Source: the author
Notes: assumptions and inputs are from the plant manager interviewed by the author
except for
* numbers are calculated by the author
** assumptions are made by the author
Table 5-19
Case Two: Project Cash Flow without Debt Financing
(Thousand RMB)
Item Year
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
1. Capital
Investment 46,000
2. Eectricity Bill
Savings 0 13,440 13,440 13,440 13,440 13,440 13,440 13,440 13,440 13,440 13,440 13,440 13,440 13,440 13,440 13,440 13,440 13,440 13,440 13,440 13,440
3. Savings from
Vapor 0 3,600 3,600 3,600 3,600 3,600 3,600 3,600 3,600 3,600 3,600 3,600 3,600 3,600 3,600 3,600 3,600 3,600 3,600 3,600 3,600
4. O&M Cost 0 2,100 2,100 2,100 2,100 2,100 2,100 2,100 2,100 2,100 2,100 2,100 2,100 2,100 2,100 2,100 2,100 2,100 2,100 2,100 2,100
5. Depreciation 2,190 2,190 2,190 2,190 2,190 2,190 2,190 2,190 2,190 2,190 2,190 2,190 2,190 2,190 2,190 2,190 2,190 2,190 2,190 2,190 2,190
6. Taxable
Income
(2+3-4-5) -2,190 12,750 12,750 12,750 12,750 12,750 12,750 12,750 12,750 12,750 12,750 12,750 12,750 12,750 12,750 12,750 12,750 12,750 12,750 12,750 12,750
7. Tax at 33% 0 3,484 4,207 4,207 4,207 4,207 4,207 4,207 4,207 4,207 4,207 4,207 4,207 4,207 4,207 4,207 4,207 4,207 4,207 4,207 4,207
8. Net Cash
Row
(2+3-1-4-7) -46,000 0 11,456 10,733 10,733 10,733 10,733 10,733 10,733 10,733 10,733 10,733 10,733 10,733 10,733 10,733 10,733 10,733 10,733 10,733 10,733 10,733
9. PV at 12% -46,000 0 9,132 7,639 6,821 6,090 5,437 4,855 4,335 3,870 3,456 3,085 2,755 2,460 2,196 1,961 1,751 1,563 1,396 1,246 1,113 993
10. Cumlative
PV -46,000 -46,000 -36,868 -29,228 -22,408 -16,318 -10,880 -6,025 -1,690 2,180 5,635 8,721 11,476 13,935 16,131 18,092 19,843 21,406 22,802 24,048 25,161 26,154
11. NPV 26,154
12. Payback
Period (years) 8.44
13. IRR 19%
Source: the author
Note: the taxable income loss can be carried forward to the next year.
Table 5-20
Case Two: Project Cash Flow with 65.2% Debt Financing at 2%/year
(Thousand RMB)
tem Year
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
1. Capital
Irestment 46,000
2. etricity Bill 0
Savings 13,440 13,440 13,440 13,440 13,440 13,440 13,440
3. Savings from 0
Vapor 3,600 3,600 3,600 3,600 3,600 3,600 3,600
4. O&M Cost 0 2,100 2,100 2,100 2,100 2,100 2,100 2,100
5. Depreciation 2,190 2,190 2,190 2,190 2,190 2,190 2,190 2,190
6. Interest at 2% 600 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
7. Taxble
income
(2+3-4-5-6) -2,790 12,750 12,750 12,750 12,750 12,750 12,750 12,750
8. Tax at 33% 0 3,286 4,207 4,207 4,207 4,207 4,207 4,207
9. Cash Flow
from Debt
Financing 30,000 -30,000
10. Net Cash
Flow
(243-1-4-6-8) -16,000 -30,600 11,654 10,733 10,733 10,733 10,733 10,733 10,733
11. PV at 12% -16,000 -27,321 9,290 7,639 6,821 6,090 5,437 4,855 4,335
12. Cumulative
PV -16,000 -43,321 -34,031 -26,392 -19,571 -13,481 -8,044 -3,189 1,146
13. NPV 28,990
14. Payback
Period (years) 7.74
15. IRR 21%
Source: the author
Note: the taxable income loss can be carried forward to the next year.
13,440
3,600
2,100
2,190
0
12,750
4,207
13,440 13,440 13,440
3,600 3,600 3,600
2,100 2,100 2,100
2,190 2,190 2,190
0 0 0
12,750 12,750 12,750
4,207 4,207 4,207
13,440
3,600
2,100
2,190
0
12,750
4,207
13,440
3,600
2,100
2,190
0
12,750
4,207
13,440
3,600
2,100
2,190
0
12,750
4,207
13,440
3,600
2,100
2,190
0
12,750
4,207
13,440
3,600
2,100
2,190
0
12,750
4,207
13,440 13,440
3,600 3,600
2,100 2,100
2,190 2,190
0 0
12,750 12,750
4,207 4,207
13,440
3,600
2,100
2,190
0
12,750
4,207
10,733 10,733 10,733 10,733 10,733 10,733 10,733 10,733 10,733 10,733 10,733 10,733
3,870 3,456 3,085 2,755 2,460 2,196 1,961 1,751 1,563 1,396 1,246 1,113
5,016 8,472 11,557 14,312 16,772 18,968 20,929 22,679 24,242 25,638 26,884 27,997
13,440
3,600
2,100
2,190
0
12,750
4,207
10,733
993
28,990
Table 5-21
Case Two: Project Cash Flow with Weighted Social Impacts
(Thousand RMB)
Item Year
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
13,440 13,440 13,440
3,600
0 2,100
2,190 2,190
3,600
2,100
2,190
13,440 13,440 13,440 13,440 13,440 13,440 13,440 13,440 13,440 13,440 13,440 13,440 13,440 13,440 13,440 13,440 13,440
3,600 3,600
2,100 2,100
2,190 2,190
3,600 3,600 3,600 3,600 3,600 3,600
2,100 2,100 2,100 2,100 2,100 2,100
2,190 2,190 2,190 2,190 2,190 2,190
3,600 3,600
2,100 2,100
2,190 2,190
3,600
2,100
2,190
3,600
2,100
2,190
3,600 3,600 3,600 3,600 3,600
2,100 2,100 2,100 2,100 2,100
2,190 2,190 2,190 2,190 2,190
3,600
2,100
2,190
600 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1. Capital
Investment
2. Electricity Bill
Savings
3. Savings from
Vapor
4. O&M Cost
5. Depreciation
6. Interest at 2%
7. Taxable
Income
(2+3-4-5-6)
8. Tax at 33%
9. Cash Flow
from Debt
Financing
12,750 12,750 12,750 12,750 12,750 12,750 12,750 12,750 12,750 12,750 12,750 12,750 12,750 12,750 12,750 12,750 12,750 12,750
4,207 4,207 4,207 4,207 4,207 4,207 4,207 4,207 4,207 4,207 4,207 4,207 4,207 4,207 4,207 4,207 4,207 4,207
10. Social
Benefits from
C02 Reduction 2,297 2,297 2,297 2,297 2,297 2,297 2,297
11. Net Cash
Flow (2+3-1-4-6-
8+9) -16,000 -30,600 13,951 13,030 13,030 13,030 13,030 13,030 13,030
12. PV at 12% -16,000 -27,321 11,121 9,274 8,281 7,393 6,601 5,894 5,262
13. Cumulative
PV -16,000 -43,321 -32,200 -22,926 -14,645 -7,252 -651 5,243 10,506
14. NPV 44,309
15. Payback
Period (years) 6.11
16. IRR 26%
Source: the author
Note: the taxable income loss can be carried forward to the next year.
2,297 2,297 2,297 2,297 2,297 2,297 2,297 2,297 2,297 2,297 2,297 2,297 2,297
13,030 13,030 13,030 13,030 13,030 13,030 13,030 13,030 13,030 13,030 13,030 13,030 13,030
4,699 4,195 3,746 3,344 2,986 2,666 2,380 2,125 1,898 1,694 1,513 1,351 1,206
15,204 19,400 23,145 26,490 29,476 32,142 34,522 36,648 38,545 40,240 41,753 43,103 44,309
46,000
-2,790 12,750 12,750
0 3,286 4,207
30,000 -30,000
(3) Weighted Social-Impact Method
I use the same estimation (119 RMB/tonne) as Case One to quantify the social
benefit from C02 emissions reduction in Case Two. As the estimated annual CO2
emission reductions are 19,320 tonnes, the annual social benefit from this reduction is
2.297 million RMB. The project economics with the weighted social-impacts are shown
in Table 5-21.
Table 5-22 summarizes the main results of the cost-benefit analysis in Case
Two.
Table 5-22
Case Two: Main Results of Cost-Benefit Analysis
NPV (12%) Payback IRRMethod (million RMB) Period
(years)
Simple Payback Method N.A. 3.08 N.A.
Without Leverage 26.15 8.44 19
DCF Analysis With 65.2% Debt 28.99 7.74 21Financing
Weighted Social-Impact Method 44.31 6.11 26
Source: the author
N.A.: Not Applicable
Sensitivity Analysis
In this part, I analyze how sensitive the project NPV with current leverage is to
electricity-price, tax-rate, and interest-rate changes.
(1) Electricity Price
Figure 5-8 shows the sensitivity of the project NPV to electricity price changes.
Every 0.01 RMB increase in the electricity price results in 1.88 million RMB increase in
the NPV. The power plant was constructed in 1997 with the electricity price of 0.32
RMB/KWh. The electricity price has increased to 0.39 RMB/KWh in 2002. Without this
power plant, Company B would have to pay a much higher electricity bill now. The
operation of the power plant enables Company B to supply electricity internally;
therefore, it helps hedge the risk of the utility electricity-price increases.
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Figure 5-8
Case Two NPV: Sensitivity to Electricity-Price Changes
(2) Tax
Figure 5-9 shows the Case Two NPV's sensitivity to corporate income-tax
rate changes. Every 1 % decrease in the corporate income-tax rate results in a
0.825 million RMB increase in the NPV. Compared to the 0.315 million RMB change
in Case One, we see that NPV is more sensitive to the tax-rate changes in the Case
Two, because Case Two has a higher leverage (65% bank loan) and much longer
term of depreciation, both of which have a larger tax-shield effect. Tax policies such
as favorable tax rate, accelerated depreciation, tax reduction, or tax credit, can
change the project NPV significantly.
(3) Interest Rate
In this case, with leverage of 65.2%, the NPV sensitivity to interest-rate changes
is shown in Figure 5-10. Every 1% increase in interest rate results in a 0.19 million
RMB decrease in the NPV. Compared to the 0.044 million RMB change in Case One,
we see that NPV is more sensitive to the interest rate in the Case Two, because it has a
much higher leverage.
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Case Two NPV: Sensitivity to Corporate Income-Tax Rate Changes
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Figure 5-10
Case Two NPV: Sensitivity to Interest-Rate Changes
Feasibility of Conducting the Power Plant Project through EMC Financing
There are currently over 300 cokemaking plants in Shanxi Province, most of
which produce plenty of COG as the by-product. According to Zhang's field trip (Zhang,
2002), some plant managers have expressed an interest in building power plants to
recover the excess COG; however, because of the fund shortage they have to wait.
Therefore, the phenomenon of burning the excess COG in the air is common in Shanxi
Province. The burnings are like torches and can often be seen along the road (see the
pictures in Appendix-1).
In this part, I discuss the feasibility of conducting the power plant project to
recover COG through EMC financing. Based on Company B's project assumptions, I
make some additional assumptions and changes. I assume that an EMC provides 70%
of the total capital investment and the host enterprise provides the rest. I assume that
the EMC can obtain 70% of its investment from a commercial bank loan. According to
the Citibank's prediction (http://www.tdctrade.com/econforum/citi/citi000802.htm), I
assume the commercial interest of the loan is 6%. I assume the loan term is three
years. As the electricity price in Shanxi Province has increased to 0.39 RMB/KWh in
2002, I use this price instead of 0.32 RMB/KWh; therefore, the annual cost savings
increases to 17.88 million RMB. I assume that the host enterprise agrees to share 85%
of the annual cost savings with the EMC for the first five years after the one-year
construction. The host enterprise enjoys the rest of the cost savings from this project.
In addition, I assume that the EMC and the host enterprise depreciate their capital
investments over 6 years and 21 years, respectively, using the straight-line method.
Other assumptions are the same as Company B's project assumptions. Table 5-23
summarizes the assumptions for the feasibility study of the power-plant project through
EMC financing.
Based on the assumptions, I conduct the DCF analysis from both the EMC and
the host enterprise's perspectives. Tables 5-24 and 5-25 show the DCFs.
Table 5-23
Assumptions of the Power-Plant Project
Inputs
Electricity price
Annual cost savings
Share of savings given to the EMC
Annual cost savings paid to the EMC
Term of savings given to the EMC
Project life term
Equipment salvage value after the life term
Project construction term
Energy escalation rate
Capital investment is depreciated equally o
9 years for the EMC
Capital investment is depreciated equally o
21 years for the host enterprise
Total investment
EMC financing ratio
EMC investment
Host enterprise investment
EMC debt ratio
Bank loan to the EMC
Interest rate
Debt financing term
Annual interest
Tax rate
Discount rate for the EMC
Discount rate for the host enterprise
Inflation rate
Source: the author
ver
ver
through EMC Financing
Values Units
0.39 RMB/KWh
17.88 Million RMB
85%
15.198 Million RMB
8 Years
21 Years
0 RMB
1 Year
0%
46
70%
31.2
13.8
70%
22.54
6%
3
1.352
Million RMB
Million RMB
Million RMB
Million RMB
Years
Million RMB
33%
12%
12%
0%
Table 5-24
Case Two: EMC's Cash Flow
(Thousand RMB)
Item Year
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
1. Capital Investment 32,200
2. Cost Savings from
the host enterprise 0 15,198 15,198 15,198 15,198 15,198
3. Depreciation 5,367 5,367 5,367 5,367 5,367 5,367
4. Interest at 6% 1,352 1,352 1,352
5. Taxable Income
(2-3-4) -6,719 8,479 8,479 9,831 9,831 9,831
6. Tax at 33% 0 581 2,798 3,244 3,244 3,244
7. Cash Flow from
Debt Financing 22,540 -22,540
8. Net Cash Flow
(2-1-4-6+7) -9,660 -1,352 13,265 -11,492 11,954 11,954 11,954
9. PV at 12% -9,660 -1,208 10,575 -8,180 7,597 6,783 6,056
10. Cumulative PV -9,660 -10,868 -293 -8,473 -876 5,907 11,963
11. NPV 11,963
12. Payback Period
(years) 4.13
13. IRR 36%
Source: the author
Note: the taxable income loss can be carried forward to the next year.
Table 5-25
Case Two: Host Enterprise's Cash Flow
(Thousand RMB)
Item Year
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
1. Capital Investment 13,800
2. 8ectricity Bil
Savings 0 16,380 16,380 16,380 16,380 16,380 16,380 16,380 16,380 16,380 16,380 16,380 16,380 16,380 16,380 16,380 16,380 16,380 16,380 16,380 16,380
3. Savings from Vapor 0 3,600 3,600 3,600 3,600 3,600 3,600 3,600 3,600 3,600 3,600 3,600 3,600 3,600 3,600 3,600 3,600 3,600 3,600 3,600 3,600
4. O&M Cost 0 2,100 2,100 2,100 2,100 2,100 2,100 2,100 2,100 2,100 2,100 2,100 2,100 2,100 2,100 2,100 2,100 2,100 2,100 2,100 2,100
5. Cost Savings Paid
to EMC 0 15,198 15,198 15,198 15,198 15,198
6. Depreciation 657 657 657 657 657 657 657 657 657 657 657 657 657 657 657 657 657 657 657 657 657
7. Taxable Income
(2+3-4-5-6) -657 2,025 2,025 2,025 2,C25 2,025 17,223 17,223 17,223 17,223 17,223 17,223 17,223 17,223 17,223 17,223 17,223 17,223 17,223 17,223 17,223
8. Tax at 33% 0 451 668 668 668 668 5,684 5,684 5,684 5,684 5,684 5,684 5,684 5,684 5,684 5,684 5,684 5,684 5,684 5,684 5,684
9. Net Cash Fkov (2+3-
1-4-5-8) -13,800 0 2,231 2,014 2,014 2,014 2,014 12,196 12,196 12196 12,196 12196 12,196 12,196 12,196 12,196 12,196 12,196 12,196 12,196 12,196 12,196
10. PV at 12% -13,800 0 1,778 1,433 1,280 1,143 1,020 5,517 4,926 4,398 3,927 3,506 3,131 2,795 2,496 2,228 1,990 1,776 1,586 1,416 1,264 1,129
11. Ctuilative PV -13,800 -13,800 -12,022 -10,588 -9,309 -8,166 -7,146 -1,629 3,297 7,696 11,622 15,129 18,259 21,054 23,550 25,778 27,768 29,544 31,130 32,546 33,811 34,939
12. NPV 34,939
13. Payback Period
(years) 7.33
14. IRR 28%
Source: the author
Note: the taxable income loss can be carried forward to the next year.
From the above tables, we can see that both the EMC and the host enterprise
have a positive NPV, 11.96 and 34.94 million RMB respectively. The two IRRs are also
well above the discount rate of 12%. Therefore, it is feasible to conduct the project
through the EMC financing. However, as the payback periods for the EMC and the host
enterprise are relatively long (4.13 and 7.33 years, respectively), they might not be very
interested in the investment. Note that the 46 million RMB capital investments may be
over estimated, and the assumptions do not include any energy-efficiency favorable
policies, such as tax reduction, accelerated depreciation, and low interest rates.9 A
decrease of capital investment and any government-supported policy will make the
project more attractive to the EMC and the host enterprise. In addition, I assume that
the EMC can access the bank loan, however, as the EMCs are still a very new concept
in China, the newly founded EMCs find it hard to obtain the commercial bank loans. I
will discuss more about EMCs' financing resources in the next chapter.
Summary of Two Case Studies
Both of the cases are about the recovery of the excess gases-COG and BF
gas. The technologies are simple and mature with little risk. From the cost-benefit
analysis, we can see that both cases have good project-evaluation indicators, with NPV
18.43 and 28.99 million RMB, IRR 41% and 21%, and a payback period of 3.5 years
and 7.74 years, respectively. Moreover, the two cases have significant social benefits.
The two projects have been conducted for several years and turned out to be fairly
successful. Besides the projects' economic and technical health, other important
9 Hamburger and Sinton (1996) show that the capital cost ranges from 15-25 million RMB to build a 6,000
Kw generator using COG/BF gas and producing 36 million KWh annually.
factors contributing to their success include that both of the host companies are large
companies with a good credit record and easy access to capital and the two projects
were conducted with some "financing privileges": the first project got the WB grant and
loan at a relatively low interest rate, and the second project obtained a large amount of
a special loan at a very low interest rate. Without such factors, enterprises may not
consider conducting such projects because of the relatively high capital investment and
the long payback period. From the above cost/benefit analysis, we find that the project
NPV is very sensitive to energy prices, financing structure, interest rates, and tax rates.
I discuss the issue of energy prices in detail in Chapter 6. Currently, there is no
effective special tax policy, such as favorable tax rate and accelerated depreciation for
energy-efficiency projects. Because the special funds from the government are not
available any longer, the financing sources and its related costs are critical to
enterprises for conducting energy-efficiency projects, especially for small and medium
enterprises with few financing sources. Therefore, EMCs' financing function is
particularly important in China's current situation.
Case One was a pilot EMC project. In this case, the EMC financed and
conducted the #2 heating furnace renovation, then Company A did the other four
heating furnaces' renovation when it happened to plan a large company renovation. In
Case Two, Company B undertook the project by itself before the EMC concept was
introduced. Both cases are successful. I also analyzed the feasibility of EMC financing
in the second case. Through the DCF analysis, I conclude that it is economically
feasible to conduct the project through EMC financing even if there is no financial
support from external sources. Then, how should a company decide whether an
energy-efficiency retrofit should be undertaken with in-house expertise or through an
EMC? The decision-maker may need to consider the following questions:
(1) Does the company have the technical capability to undertake the retrofit?
The decision-maker needs to consider whether the company has the qualified technical
staff to audit the facility for energy use and potential energy savings and to design a
comprehensive energy-efficiency retrofit for the facility. If the company does have the
expertise, then do the technical staff have the time to design, install, and maintain the
retrofit? If the company does not have the expertise or the opportunity costs are very
high with in-house expertise to undertake the retrofit, the decision-maker may consider
conducting the retrofit through EMCs. EMCs, specialized in this area, can provide the
whole package of services with guaranteed energy savings.
(2) Does the company have difficulty in financing the energy-efficiency capital
investment? The decision-maker needs to see if the company has the capital available
to finance the energy-efficiency project internally or if there are external financing
options available. If the company does have difficulty in financing the project, the
decision-maker should consider turning to EMCs who also provide financing services to
energy-efficiency projects.
(3) Does the company want to avoid the risk that the project will produce the
projected savings on a verifiable basis so as to ensure that the capital investment is
covered out of saved energy costs? If the decision-maker does not want the company
to take the risk, EMCs should be considered. Through energy-performance contracting,
the EMC will assume the risk that the project will pay for itself from the energy and
operations and maintenance savings projected in the time period allotted and guarantee
that project-related energy savings are sufficient to cover project costs.
In summary, EMCs offer a wide range of services and expertise in the design,
installation, maintenance, and financing of comprehensive energy-efficiency projects, as
well as a guarantee of project performance. This expertise and full-service approach
can be utilized to ensure the most comprehensive and cost-effective retrofit possible.
However, if the facility's maintenance staff includes professional engineers who are
familiar with state-of-the-art, high-efficiency equipment, and related measures and
technologies, and if financing is available for the project, it might be cost-effective to
consider using in-house resources to accomplish the project.
As EMCs provide financing services and are responsible to repay the project
loan, it is crucial for EMCs to manage project risks and ensure that the host enterprises
would pay the agreed share of cost savings. The EMC managers may consider the
following factors when selecting host enterprises: (1) the host enterprise should have
shown a credit rating of AAA or AA, or equivalent; (2) it should have sufficient liquidity to
make payments on time, e.g., the debt ratio (debt/total assets) should be less than 70%,
the current ratio (current assets/current liability) should be bigger than one; (3) it should
have demonstrated stable production and market condition and have shown a net profit
in the last few years; and (4) it should have a clear and stable company ownership and
sound company management.
Finally, it should be noted that I made several not very realistic assumptions to
simplify the calculations of the two cases. I use the discount rate of 12% for all the
calculations, however, the discount rate, as the opportunity cost of capital, will be
different among enterprises as they have different business, risk, capital structure, etc.
To capture the effect of the changes in discount rate, I present the results of the two
cases using the alternative discount rates of 10% and 15% in Table 5-26. In the two
case studies, I also assume that the total capital investments are equally depreciated or
amortized over the project life. However, the different investments may be depreciated
or amortized differently according to the accounting rules.
Table 5-26
Summary of the Two Cases Results in the Two Discount Rate Scenarios
10% Discount Rate 15% Discount Rate
NPV Payback NPV Payback
(Million RMB) Period (Million RMB) Period
(Year) (Year)
Case One
Without Leverage 17.72 4.37 10.70 5.02
DCF With IBRD Grant 21.42 3.39 14.67 3.68
Analysis and Debt FinancingEMC 3.72 1.69 3.01 1.76
Company A 18.39 3.90 12.48 4.17
Weighted Social-Impact Method 86.90 1.59 65.82 1.65
Case Two
DCF Without Leverage 37.66 7.54 12.96 10.17
Analysis With 65.2% Debt 40.01 7.11 16.50 8.88Financing
Weighted Social-Impact Method 57.79 5.72 29.01 6.80
Source: the author
CHAPTER 6
INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON AND POLICY ANALYSIS
EMCs are still very young in China, and their development depends on several
critical factors. In this chapter, through the comparative analysis of the ESCO
development process in five countries-the United States, South Korea, Hungary, India,
and China, I identify the key factors influencing ESCO development and analyze their
implications for China. I emphasize the importance of the government policy and give
recommendations on what the government can do to promote EMCs in China.
Experiences in Other Countries and Lessons Learned
As energy price and environmental concerns regarding energy consumption
increase, the ESCO concept becomes more and more popular. More than 25 countries
have introduced ESCOs in recent years. In this section, through a comparative analysis
of ESCOs' development in the United States, South Korea, Hungary, India, and China, I
summarize what China's EMCs could learn from the experiences and lessons of
ESCOs' development in other countries. Among these countries, China is the most
recent to have EMCs. I chose the United States because ESCOs were initiated here
and have developed into a relatively mature industry. I chose South Korea because
South Korea has a cultural background similar to China's and ESCOs have been
developed for a decade with a rapid growth in recent years. I chose Hungary because
the Hungarian ESCO market is rather well developed compared to other emerging
economies, especially in the municipal sector. I chose India because it is also a major
energy consumer with one of the highest energy intensity in the world and India's
ESCOs have been developed a little bit longer than China's, but India's ESCOs have
not turned out successfully. Because I have elaborated ESCOs' development in the
United States and China in Chapters 3 and 4, I first describe the ESCO market in South
Korea, Hungary, and India, respectively, and then I compare the key factors among the
five countries (Table 6-1).10
South Korean ESCO Market
1. Initiation and Development Process
The ESCO concept was first introduced by a joint venture of Samsung Everland
and a Canadian ESCO at the end of the 1980s; however, the joint venture was not
successful in expanding its business, because it had difficulties in overcoming cultural
differences and high initial investments.
In South Korea, ESCOs began to develop when the government started the
promotion programs in 1993 and accelerated their growth after 1997. The strong
financial and institutional support programs initiated by the South Korean government
and the Korea Energy Management Corporation (KEMCO) are the main contributions to
this development. First, the Rational Energy Utilization Act was amended in 1991 to
prepare a legal background to support South Korean ESCOs. Accordingly, long-term
and low-interest loans coming from the Special Account for Energy and Resource
Project have been provided to ESCO investment projects since 1993. The KEMCO has
been playing a very important role as an indirect financial intermediary in the process.
Tax credit for ESCO investment has also been provided. As in many other Asian
countries, South Korean culture is conservative and risk averse; therefore, the new
concept and new practices, such as energy performance contracting, are very difficult to
10 The references for the ESCOs/EMCs development in the five countries are listed after Table 6-1.
get started. In 1998, the South Korean government amended the provisions of
government procurement, budget, and accounting to remove this cultural impediment
and enlarge the ESCO market in the public sector. After the government demonstration
project, interests from the public sector as well as the private sector have remarkably
increased. In addition, the rapid increase in energy prices after the financial crisis in
Asia in 1997, the reduction of energy subsidies, and the reform of the energy tax system
have also driven up the interest in energy savings and in ESCOs in South Korea.
2. Current Status
The South Korean ESCOs have shown remarkable growth between 1997 and
2000, and they have become an important player in energy-efficiency financing. During
this period, the investment in the South Korean ESCOs has increased by more than 12
times from US$5.99 million to US$75.79 million, and the number of projects has rapidly
increased from 25 to 519. The number of officially registered ESCOs is currently 125.
Public-sector customers are the major clients of the South Korean ESCOs, comprising
about a 40% share in 2000, while industrial sector customers comprise about 30%.
3. Lessons
The success of the South Korean ESCOs is mainly attributed to the following
factors:
(1) The South Korean government plays a very active role in removing
institutional barriers and mobilizing necessary capital;
(2) The government procurement reform helped enlarge the ESCO market in the
public sector;
(3) The demonstration project in the public sector helped remove the cultural
impediment;
(4) The strategy, from simple technologies and minimum measurement and
verification (M&V) to advanced ones, has worked very effectively to develop
ESCOs in South Korea; and
(5) The reduction of energy subsidies and the reform of the energy-tax system
helped increase the number of ESCOs.
Hungarian ESCO Market
1. Initiation
In the early 1990s, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(EBRD) established, in cooperation with a number of western private sector sponsors, a
series of multi-project facilities (MPF) designed to set up ESCOs in several European
countries. The EBRD contributes financing in the form of loans and assumes some of
the entrepreneurial risk. Under these arrangements, the private-sector ESCOs have
been established in several eastern European countries, including Lithuania, Poland,
Slovakia, and Hungary (WEEA, 1999).
2. Current Status
After about one decade of development in Europe, Hungary appears to have the
most mature market for ESCOs, especially their services to the municipal sector in the
region. There are about 100 ESCOs in Hungary. The number of ESCOs which do not
provide financing, under the concept of "the end-user as the borrower," is estimated to
be between 50 and 100, with a market value of US$ 4-8 million. The number of ESCOs
that provide financing, under the concept of "the ESCO as the borrower," is estimated to
be between 10 and 20, with a market value of US$ 12-20 million. Finally, the number of
ESCOs that also offer operation services as well as provide financing is under 10, with a
market value of US$ 20-28 million. Utility-based ESCOs are developing rapidly.
Because the electric utilities have territorial monopolies in Hungary, utility-based ESCOs
without territorial limitations are driven by the wish to increase their share of the ESCO
market as well as to expand the market of the owner electric utilities.
For most of the products and services in Hungry, the value added tax (VAT) is
typically 25%, while the exceptional category for energy services, such as supply of
electricity, gas, or heat, is 12%. The application of the VAT to the ESCO depends on
the categorization of its service. Currently, the authorities evaluate ESCO projects case
by case. Hungary's ESCOs have customers in any type of energy end-users with
significant annual energy costs, but they are especially successful with municipalities.
Regarding the sources of financing, for "the end-user as the borrower," the
ESCOs work with all the Hungarian commercial banks which finance energy-efficiency
projects. The biggest such bank, which accounts for more than 80% of the financing, is
the National Savings Bank (OTP Bank). Others include Raiffeisen Bank, K&H Bank,
and Budapest Bank. For "the ESCO as the borrower," most of the Hungarian ESCOs
and foreign ownership ESCOs get money from commercial banks that operate in
Hungary. The "Hungary Energy Efficiency Cofinancing Program (HEECP)" provides
guarantees for banks that finance private ESCOs. HEECP was initiated and launched
by the International Finance Corporation (IFC).
There is currently no ESCO association in Hungary. However, Central Europe
(Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Poland) is considering the creation of an
association of ESCOs in this region, with the support of International Energy Agency
(IEA) and Climate Technology Initiative (CTI) national energy efficiency organizations
(IEA/CTI, 2002).
3. Lessons
The reasons for the relative success of the Hungarian ESCOs are not general
and have varied throughout the past twelve years. The ESCO concept was not initially
successful at all in Hungary. Except for the common barriers, some other reasons for
this include (1) uncertainty of local decision-makers due to relatively new independence
after the breakup of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) from central control
and discomfort with utilizing a new concept, (2) the unstable financial conditions and
under developed regulations, and (3) the bad image created by some venture-capital
companies who tried to act as ESCOs.
Because there was a serious need later for energy-efficiency projects, in addition
to the stabilization of the legislation background and the financial institutions, the ESCO
concept received more attention than before. The strong demand from the
municipalities to use every opportunity for savings due to the tight budget helped
implement the first few ESCO projects, which proved to be highly successful. Since
then, the following reasons further helped the development of the ESCO business:
(1) In the early 1990s, large and quick increases in fuel-oil prices made energy-
efficiency projects more attractive.
(2) The VAT rate difference between the procurement of goods (25%) and
energy (12%) provided incentives for clients to outsource and buy energy at a
lower tax rate than they would pay if buying equipment.
(3) In January 2001, the government set a very favorable buy-back price for
100
cogenerated electricity and made it compulsory for the power utilities to buy
any independently generated power that comes from a plant smaller than 20
MW. This helped develop a new market for ESCOs. About a hundred small-
scale cogeneration projects were implemented by ESCOs.
(4) The recent energy-market liberalization helped the emergence of utility-based
ESCOs. Almost all big utilities set up their own ESCOs in order to offer
energy services for their large clients, or in order to keep or increase their
markets.
Indian ESCO Market
1. Initiation
After an ESCO feasibility study, India's first ESCO was established in early 1994
as a joint venture between the US-based International Energy Service Company and a
private power company in India. The initial market drivers included (1) Severe energy
shortage and a trend toward higher prices-there was a severe electrical-energy-
capacity shortage and a market trend toward increasing energy costs; (2) A large
market-there was a great potential to improve energy efficiency in Indian industries; (3)
The economic reform toward openness and competition-the economy was relatively
stable, and some reforms were launched to make India more open and competitive on a
global basis, so that companies began to pay more attention to cost control; (4)
Availability of efficient equipment-Indian manufactures were rapidly adding energy-
efficient technology, and the customs duties levied on imports of energy-efficiency
products were reduced; and (5) Accelerated depreciation on energy conservation
equipment-to encourage energy conservation, 100 percent of the cost of energy-
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conservation equipment was depreciable over the first year.
2. Current Status
Although they have developed for several years, the Indian ESCOs are still in
their infancy. There are few players, few ESCO projects sites as yet, and few ESCO
projects in the offing. Energy-efficiency equipment manufactures or big business
houses support some of the active ESCOs in India, focusing their efforts on vertically
integrating operations to offer energy audit, equipment sales, installation, maintenance,
and financing services. Some are the Indian counterparts of international ESCOs. As
far as performance contracting is concerned, no project has relied on a classical or pure
performance contract; usually the client is responsible for raising funds for energy-
efficiency improvements and making payments to lenders, while the ESCO guarantees
savings. ESCOs are only now steadily building up their credibility. ESCOs receive little
or no support from the government or utilities. There is no ESCO association at
present, whereas there are several industry associations representing various industry
groups and having a potential role in developing ESCOs in India. In addition, some
bilateral donor support from the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and
the World Bank has become available to the Indian ESCO industry. The planned
support includes: (1) Preparing various case studies of successful ESCO projects; (2)
Building capacity and developing infrastructure of ESCOs; and (3) Conducting training
for development of skilled manpower for the ESCO industry.
3. Lessons
Although all the fundamental market drivers necessary for the emergence of a
successful and vibrant ESCO industry exist in India, ESCOs have developed slowly
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over these years. The reasons are directly related to the inadequate government or
utility support, as well as the constraint of the ESCO financing system:
0 Government or utility support None of the existing ESCOs is supported by
either the central or state governments or the utilities. The government is more
concerned with power-sector reforms and restructuring, which focus on the
sustainability of the power utilities and rationalization of power tariffs rather than
efficiency-related issues. The power utilities are also pre-occupied with strengthening
the distribution systems. Therefore, the government or utility support is unlikely to
emerge in the short term unless special attention is paid to ESCOs.
. ESCO financing system: Currently, the client is responsible for raising
funds for energy-efficiency improvements and making repayments to lenders. This
financing mode is less attractive to clients especially when the ESCO concept is
relatively new and clients lack capital for financing energy-efficiency projects.
Furthermore, there is no incentive provided by the utilities or the government, and the
rates of return in other investments in Indian industries are high. Innovative supporting
financing programmes are strongly needed.
In addition, the system of legal redress in India leaves much to be desired. Some
ESCOs are forced to discontinue their operations because of Indian's immature legal
system.
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Table 6-1
Comparative Analysis of ESCOS'/EMCs' Development in
the United States, South Korea, Hungary, India, and China
Item United States South Korea Hungary India China
Late 1970s and early 1980s At the end of 1980s, the concept Early 1990s 1994 Three pilot EMCs
was first introduced by a joint were founded in
ear venture of Samsung Everland 1996.
Initiated nd a Canadian ESCO, but itwas not successful; in1993, the
government started the
promotion program
Market motivated. Three The South Korean government EBRD incorporated with A joint venture between WB/GEF China
main origins: engineering and Korea Energy Management western private sponsors the US based Energy
consulting firms, Corporation (KEMCO) International Energy Conservation
Initiator(s) manufacturers of energy Service Company and a Project
control systems, and DSM private power company in
motivated ESCOs formed by India
utilities or private investors.
(1) The increase in energy (1) Strong financial support by (1) Large and quick (1) Severe energy 'Energy
price, (2) Tax incentives, and the government through a increases in the fuel oil hortage and trend toward Efficiency
(3) Utility DSM bidding special account, (2) The price, (2) Strong need for higher prices, (2) a large Paradox" (see
programs. provisions of government nergy-efficiency projects market, (3) Economic Chapter 2)
procurement, budget, and from municipalities due to reform towards openness
Drivers accounting were revised to ight budget, (3) A nd competition, (4)
remove the institutional barrier, ifference in the VAT rate vailability of efficient
and (3) The increase in energy between the procurement of quipment, and (5)
prices. goods and energy, and (4) Accelerated depreciation
Energy market liberalization on energy conservation
(1)Largean kquipment.
Over 60 125 iround 100 9 ESCOs with loose 3 pilot EMCs plus
Number of efinition. newly formed
ESCOs EMCs by the end
____ ___ ___ ___  ___ ___ ____ ___ ___ __ of 2001
Number of >1500 519 in 2000 N/A Few ggregate
Projects number by April
reform12 towar002 is 209
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Item United States South Korea Hungary India China
$1.8-2 Billion in 2000 The total investment: $ 75.79 $ 40-60 million in 2002 N/A Aggregate
Business million in 2000 investment by
Size April 2002: $45.5
million
Institutional sector customers Public sector customers were the Any types, especially Mainly in industry sector. Mainly in industry
Scope of are major clients with about major clients with about 40% successful with sector with about
Clients 75% share (upper bound). share in 2000 and industrial municipalities 70% share
sector customers occupy about
30% share.
Financing The guaranteed-savings Shared-savings model The shared-savings model The guaranteed-savings Shared-savings
Model model is more common, is more common, >80%. model is more common. model
>60%.
Most ESCO projects are Long term and low interest loans Either the client or the he client is responsible hree pilot EMs
financed by the customer rom the government have been ESCO gets money from or raising funds for et financing from
borrowing directly from a available to ESCO investment ommercial banks. nergy efficiency B/GEF funds.
Source of bank or other lending projects since 1993: Special improvements and making Progress is also
Financing institutions. Account for Energy and payments to lenders. made to obtain
Resource Project. financing from
local financing
institutions.
No guarantee program No guarantee program HEECP provides No guarantee program A loan guarantee
Guarantee guarantees for banks that program is in thefinance private ESCOs process of
establishment.
Energy tax credit for energy- Tax credit for ESCO investment VAT is 25% for most of the 100% of the cost of No tax credit for
efficiency projects projects products and services and energy conservation EMCs.
Taxing 12% for energy services. equipment is depreciable
ESCO projects are over the first year.
evaluated case by case.
National Association of There is currently no national There is currently no There is currently no In the process of
ESCO Energy Services Companies ESCO association. national ESCO association. ESCO association, but establishment
Association (NAESCO) Central Europe ESCO several industry
association may be ssociations work as
established in the future. atalysts for ESCOs.
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Item United States South Korea Hungary India China
(1) Most states have enacted (1) The government plays an (1) A difference in the VAT (1) There is little or no Discussed later in
enabling policies or active role to remove institutional rate between the support from the the chapter
legislation to promote barriers and mobilize necessary procurement of goods and overnment or utilities;
performance contracting in capital; (2) The importance of energy gives incentives to and
their public sector demonstration project in the ESCO projects; (2) A strong (2) Availability of efficient
institutional market; (2) public sector; (3) Starting with a demand for ESCO projects technology is not a major
Public sector procurement simple technology with less started from municipalities; constraint.
reform facilitates the success transaction costs (cheap M&V), and (3) The liberalization of
Key Lessons of ESCOs in the institutional then from simple to advanced the electric market drives a
market; and (3) Utility ones; and (4) The government number of utility-based
incentives: rebates and the reduced energy subsidies and ESCOs and spurs the
performance-base payments reformed energy tax system. ESCO market.
associated with DSM bidding
programs, and standard
performance contract (SPC)
programs
N/A (1) Continuous demand such as (1) A better understanding (1) Skilled staff is hard to Discussed later in
in a residential sector needs to of the ESCO approach by find; and (2) the ESCO the chapter
be created; (2) The technological the end-users is needed; (2) infrastructure
and financial capabilities of local Up-front project development will take
Future ESCOs needs to be further built; development costs are high; time.
Challenges (3) Private investment needs to and (3) Successful ESCO
be mobilized into the ESCO projects are needed to
business; and (4) Electricity widely spread.
industry needs to be
restructured.
Note: This comparison is ordered by the initiated year.
N/A: Not Available
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The above comparison (text and Table 6-1) shows that except for the U.S.
ESCOs, ESCOs were introduced either by an international organization (e.g., World
Bank, EBRD) and the government or by a joint venture. Lessons from South Korea and
India show that without government support, a joint venture with an U.S.- or Canada-
based international ESCO may not be able to incorporate local characteristics to
develop ESCOs successfully. ESCOs were initiated in the United States and are most
developed there in terms of the number of projects and business size. ESCOs in South
Korea and Hungary started at approximately the same time and both of them have
achieved considerable business size. Although China is the latest to introduce EMCs, it
has made impressive progress, and the development situation is better than in India. In
terms of scope of clients, ESCOs in the United States, South Korea, and Hungary have
more shares in the public/institutional sector, while ESCOs/EMCs in India and China
mainly focus on the industry sector, which is highly energy intensive. The shared-
savings model is more common in South Korea, Hungary, and China because this
financing model is more attractive to clients especially when the ESCO concept is
relatively young. As U.S. ESCOs have been well developed, the guaranteed-saving
model is more common. Using the guaranteed-saving model in India is one reason that
the Indian ESCOs are developing relatively slowly, because this model cannot
effectively solve clients' financing-shortage problem. The sources of ESCO project
financing vary across countries depending on their financial markets' development, but
commercial financing institutions have shown to be the sustainable financing sources,
and the government financial support can effectively help ESCOs' development when
commercial financing is unavailable.
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There is no "one-size-fits-all" model in developing ESCO projects. However,
from the above comparative analysis of ESCOs' development in five countries, I
conclude that there are two important challenges faced by ESCOs, especially in
developing/transitional countries.
(1) Lack of understanding about ESCOs. The ESCO concept is still fairly new
in developing and transitional countries. It has not been fully understood
and accepted by customers, government agencies, and financial
institutions.
(2) Financing problem. There are only a few options for ESCOs to obtain
financing: local financial institutions, multilateral development banks
(MDBs), and government special loans/funds. Two main obstacles impede
ESCOs from getting the local commercial financing: (a) the local financing
institutions have little local experience with project financing, and they lack
expertise to evaluate projects; and (b) the interest rates are high, and the
repayment terms are short. The obstacles to get financing from MDBs
include: (a) MDBs usually limit the project size, (b) the lending mostly goes
to the government, (c) host governments are often reluctant to provide
guarantees, (d) the hard currency repayment is required, and (e) the
transaction costs are high. In addition, some governments are cuffing
special loans/funds during the transitional period.
From my comparative analysis, I have also shown that two main factors are
critical to the development of ESCO business: energy prices and government policy. I
analyze the implication of these two factors for China below.
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Energy Prices in China
The increase in energy prices is a major driver of ESCOs' initial and later
development in the United States, South Korea, Hungary, and India. Table 6-2 and
Figure 6-1 show China's average coal and oil energy prices from 1995 to 2002.
Although the energy-price impacts are not so obvious in driving the Chinese EMCs'
establishment, the price liberalization in primary energy provided the prerequisite for the
EMC business before its introduction in 1996.
Table 6-2
China's Average Coal and Oil Energy Prices: 1995-2002
(U.S.$/ton)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Bituminous 25.63 27.71 28.79 29.69 28.69 27.28 27.16 30.31
Gasoline 313.75 313.96 326.14 323.17 323.59 426.36 425.77 392.52
Diesel 272.14 279.31 309.21 286.77 298.90 391.80 376.12 349.07
Sources: 1. 1995-1999:China E-news: Energy, Environment,
http://www.pni.qov/china/prices.htm
2. 2000-2002: compiled by the author based on the
Center.
Economy.
data from the Beijing Energy Efficiency
Source: Table 6-2
Figure 6-1
China's Average Coal and Oil Energy Prices: 1995-2002
110
450
400
350
250
200
150
100
50
0
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Year
-+ Coal
--- Gasoline
-A- Diesel
Coal
Coal prices in China have been liberalized since 1993. Although coal prices
continued to rise until 1997, they fell in 1998 and 1999, implying a large drop in demand
compared to supply, since markets for coal are relatively free. This drop occurred even
before the campaign in 1999 to shut down thousands of small coalmines, suggesting
that this move, in part, may have been intended to support coal prices by restricting
supply. The recovery of coal prices from the recession began in 2002 as the
government's tough measures of reducing the domestic coal supply while boosting
exports were starting to pay off. China has taken a series of measures, including tax
rebates, to spur export companies to boost coal exports. (Sinton et al., 1999)
Electricity
Electricity prices rose through 1998, as was the case throughout all earlier years
in the decade. In 1999, however, with the rescinding of hundreds of illegal fees,
average power prices dropped significantly. The drop was especially pronounced in
rural areas, where many layers of miscellaneous fees inflated retail rates to several
times the levels charged to urban customers. In Hainan Province, electricity rates fell
by half. Excess capacity in some regional grids also removed upward pressure on
rates. In areas with excess capacity, utilities have begun to encourage greater use of
electricity, indicating further reduced incentives to use electricity more efficiently.
(Sinton et al., 1999)
111
Oil
Oil prices still remain under state control. China's oil price regime came under
severe pressure, and it eventually collapsed in early 1998, when international oil prices
fell sharply. A new oil-price policy started in June 1998, with the domestic price pegged
to Singapore's, but with a one-month lag. Since then, domestic oil prices have been set
with reference to changes in Singapore's oil-export prices, but they remain significantly
higher than import parity prices, leading to a need for continued vigilance against a
renewed surge of smuggled oil products. (Sinton et al., 1999)
Natural Gas
Prices of natural gas are also highly controlled. The state-set price to most
customers was adjusted significantly upward in 1997, and the price to some classes of
consumers is in near parity with imported liquefied natural gas (LNG). Heavy subsidies
remain in place, however, for fertilizer manufacturers. (Sinton et al., 1999)
The above energy-price analysis by types provides a mixed prospect for energy-
price changes; however, it shows that the energy subsidies are not an obstacle to
energy-efficiency projects. Generally, energy prices reflect the supply and demand in
the market. Energy-efficiency projects are investments to hedge the fluctuation risks of
energy prices.
Government Policy in China
Besides ensuring a stable economy conducive to long-term investment, a
government commitment is needed to develop and maintain a range of energy-
efficiency-friendly policies. These policies range from financing support, such as tax
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incentives, special loans, and government guarantees, to government-procurement
policy and utility reforms. My comparative analysis shows that these government
policies play a critical role in the development of ESCOs. The success of ESCOs in the
United States, South Korea, and Hungary is attributed to the government-supported
policy. The undesirable development of the Indian ESCOs is related to the poor support
from the government and utilities. Therefore, the future development of China's EMCs
depends on the government's willingness to carry out regulatory changes and
establishing a suitable institutional structure.
Energy conservation is a long-term strategic policy in China. China began to
carry out energy-saving activities in a planned and organized manner at the beginning
of the 1980's. After 20 years of development, China has already established a set of
energy-conservation policies, laws, and regulations with the "Energy-Conservation Law"
as the core, and corresponding energy-conservation administrative and services
organizations. However, the Energy-Conservation Law is broad in its provisions and
gives little guidance for implementation. Responsibilities among different organizations
are broadly defined and leave areas of uncertainty and potential overlap. For a
considerable period of time, energy-conservation investment in China adapted the
following three fund-raising sources: (1) the government, (2) enterprises, and (3) bank
loans. However, as China is transforming to a market economy, the special energy-
saving fund is cut by the government. Owing to the insufficient incentive mechanism, it
is difficult to channel the funds from the enterprise and banks to the energy-saving
projects even if the enterprise wants to save energy. Some technically and
economically sound energy-efficiency projects are therefore not implemented as
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discussed in Chapter 2. With the help of the World Bank, China has introduced the
EMC mechanism to promote energy conservation. However, government-supported
policies have not been well established.
According to the experiences and lessons from the ESCOs' development in other
countries, I recommend that the government should implement the following policies to
promote China's EMCs' development.
(1) Policies to promote the development of the market for energy-efficiency projects
Government support is especially important in the initial stages of an energy-
efficiency program. The supporting policies may include:
" Reforming the procurement regulations in the public sector, opening up
governmental facilities for EMC projects, and setting up demonstration projects to
build confidence among stakeholders and awareness programmes;
" Setting up efficiency standards, putting up necessary regulatory measures in
place, and initiating labeling programs;
" Providing tax incentives to EMCs' investments, such as tax credits for energy-
efficiency projects, accelerated depreciation of energy-saving equipment, and tax
deductions to EMC projects;
* Linking energy efficiency and environmental goals and enforcing environmental
regulations;
" Collecting, managing, and disseminating energy-efficiency information through
setting up an information center, energy-efficiency data base, etc;
" Liberalizing the electric market and encouraging utility demand-side
management;
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* Improving flows of capital, technology, and knowledge through policies affecting
foreign investment, joint ventures, energy-efficiency technology import, etc.
In addition, the government can use Voluntary Agreements as an integrating
energy-efficiency policy. Voluntary Agreements are "essentially a contract between the
government and industry, or negotiated targets with commitments and time schedules
on the part of all participating parties." (IEA, 1997) A key element of Voluntary
Agreements is that they focus the attention of all actors on energy efficiency or emission
reduction goals. The SETC signed an Energy Conservation Voluntary Agreement Pilot
Project in the steel sector in Shandong Province in April 2003. The Shandong ETC
formulated a list of supporting policies that were be offered to the participating
enterprises to assist them in achieving their energy-efficiency targets. The supporting
policies include information dissemination, government and public recognition, and
financial assistance and incentives (Price, et al., 2003). Next steps include possibly
extending the Voluntary Agreements to more steel mills in China, to other industrial
sectors in China, and writing an Energy Conservation Law implementing regulation
related to Voluntary Agreements. Voluntary Agreements, as a new energy conservation
incentive policy mechanism, are expected to promote the development of the market for
energy-efficiency projects.
(2) Policies to promote the development of the local financing market
The most important sources of commercial financing for energy-efficiency
investment are local financial institutions: commercial banks, non-bank financial
institutions such as leasing companies, and government- and privately-owned
development banks that lend to enterprises. Because many energy-efficiency
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investments are small, local financial institutions play a very important role as retail
distribution agents. It is crucial to promote the development of the local financing
market for a sustainable energy-efficiency program. The supporting policies may
include:
" Establishing a guarantee fund. As the EMC concept is still new in China and
most EMCs do not have a credit history, financial institutions usually require
guarantees before providing the energy-efficiency financing. Note that as one of
the core components of the WB/GEF China Energy Conservation Project II,
China is establishing the EMC loan-guarantee program.
" Developing an insurance product for EMC projects. It is a similar mechanism to
a guarantee to help EMCs get financing. However, the transaction costs may be
fairly high unless a sizable insurance market can develop.
" Developing a specialized energy-efficiency financing window in a demonstration
financial institution. This demonstration window is designed to apply the
specialized methods to appraise energy-efficiency projects based on energy-
saving models. The mechanism can be standardized for small projects to keep
the transaction costs low and the aggregation of small projects could also be
applied.
* Establishing a specialized energy-efficiency fund. The fund can be used to
develop the requisite expertise to appraise the energy-efficiency projects and to
enhance the EMC credit through co-financing.
" Supporting the development of leasing and vendor financing. As introduced in
Chapter 3, leasing and vendor financing are two important financing options for
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energy-efficiency projects, and both of them can be embedded into the ESCO
financing. The supported policy may include allowing lessors/vendors to retain
priority liens on equipment, protecting the rights of lessors/vendors to repossess
in the event of default, and clarifying tax treatments when equipment ownership
and use are separated between parties.
(3) Policies to promote the development of EMCs' capability to conduct energy-
efficiency projects
EMCs' capability to design the performance contracting and implement the
energy-efficiency projects is the key to their market expansion. It is important that
EMCs can access the model contracts, procedures, and case studies of best practices.
An EMC association can take up this role to disseminate this information and provide
technical support. As one of the core components of the WB/GEF China Energy
Conservation Project II, China is establishing an EMC association. It is necessary that
the government provides the supported policy in its establishment and encourages its
exchanges with international ESCO associations.
In addition, a reliable and enforceable contract system is crucial to EMCs'
development. Efforts are needed from the government to improve the existing legal
system.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
In this study, I began with the phenomena of the "energy-efficiency paradox" and
established that the financing problem is the most critical barrier impeding energy-
efficiency projects in China. Then, I discussed the energy-efficiency financing strategies
and focused on the innovation of ESCOs (EMCs) hypothesizing that this young industry
will provide an effective financing mechanism to help China improve its energy
efficiency. Through a review of the current EMCs' development in China and two case
studies of improving energy-efficiency in coal-related industries, I analyzed how EMCs
can effectively promote energy efficiency in China. However, EMCs would not be
prosperous on their own. Through the comparative analysis of ESCOs' development in
five countries including China, I identified the key factors affecting ESCOs and gave
policy recommendations based on experiences and lessons learned from other
countries. In this chapter, I summarize the benefits to promote EMCs in China, the
challenges EMCs are facing, and a prospective for EMCs' development in China.
Benefits to Promoting EMCs in China
The promotion of EMCs in China can lead to a truly win-win situation in that
benefits accrue to customers, utilities, market intermediaries, and society, as
summarized below:
(1) Benefits accruing to customers (host enterprises)
Benefits accruing to customers include the reduced capital requirement,
enhanced performance, and decreased risk. Because EMCs provide financing
services, the customers need not confront a large initial energy-efficiency investment.
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Thus, the customers' energy bills are reduced with little or no capital required from
them. The EMCs' financing service is especially beneficial to small and medium
enterprises (SMEs), both because they have higher energy intensity and more difficulty
in accessing financing than large enterprises. Because EMCs are specialized
companies providing energy-efficiency services, the customers need not worry about
the eligibility of in-house expertise and the customers' energy-efficiency retrofit would be
better implemented than through in-house expertise. In addition, EMCs' profit directly
relates to the actual energy savings, and the nature of the performance contract
requires attention to monitoring the retrofit results, leading to better operation and
maintenance of energy-efficiency equipment than through their own resources.
Because the customers pay only for demonstrated results, they have little or no risk.
Moreover, energy-efficiency implementation can decrease the customers' risk exposure
to energy-price changes and lead to improved comfort, convenience, productivity, and
competitiveness.
(2) Benefits accruing to utilities
The promotion of EMCs can lead to a rapid implementation of energy-efficiency
programs, therefore reducing the utility's pressure and capital investment to expand the
capacity. In addition, EMCs can help develop the DSM program in China's utilities and
improve their customer service and customer relations. If EMCs and utilities cooperate
to develop the best possible energy-efficiency options, this can contribute towards least-
cost development of energy resources.
(3) Benefits accruing to market intermediaries, such as manufacturers, suppliers,
dealers, and financial institutions
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EMCs can be an important market channel for the sale of energy-efficiency
products and services and financial institutions can expand their business through
EMCs. Furthermore, market intermediaries can conceivably obtain higher returns by
participating in the ESCO projects as partners.
(4) Benefits accruing to society
Benefits accruing to society include the improved environment and increased
productivity, comfort, and employment. The EMC projects reduce the environmental
damage caused by the production, conversion, transportation, and utilization of energy.
Therefore, the social benefits, such as health improvement from reduced pollution, can
be substantial, which I showed in two case studies in Chapter 5. The promotion of
EMCs will lower the utilization of energy resources and energy costs, which will lead to
the overall higher productivity, comfort, and convenience. Because EMCs' development
will help decrease China's energy intensity and greenhouse gas emissions, China's
reputation in the world will increase. In addition, EMCs, as a new industry, will help
increase employment. EMCs' development will also help increase the awareness of
energy efficiency and motivate R&D on energy-efficiency technology.
Challenges Faced by EMCs in China
China's EMCs are still in their infancy. Despite their initial achievements, China's
EMCs face the following five challenges:
(1) Lack of awareness of the basic EMC concept
Although EMCs have been introduced in China for several years and steady
efforts have been made to publicize the concept of energy-performance contracting,
120
most groups still do not know the basic idea. Continuing massive efforts are needed to
raise the awareness. (WB, 2002)
(2) Lack of knowledge and skills to operate EMCs
Energy-performance contracting operated by EMCs is a novel and sophisticated
business concept. Their successful operation requires the following capabilities: (a)
excellent and up-to-date knowledge of energy-conservation technologies and their
practical application to provide value-added to customers and minimize technical risks;
(b) ability to assess and minimize host enterprise credit risks through employing various
credit-appraisal techniques and a variety of options to secure repayment prospects; (c)
sophisticated corporate financial management including project portfolio risk
management; and (d) capability to manage contracts, procurement, and project
implementation. These capabilities need to be gained not only through business
alliances, well conceived staffing policies, and extensive training, but also through
learning from past experiences. Obtaining this knowledge and skills is a daunting task
for China's EMCs. (WB, 2002)
(3) Lack of credit financing for EMCs' development
As Chinese commercial banks are currently under strict interest-rate regulations
which do not have the flexibility to enable loan pricing based on risk, they are
particularly risk averse and usually do not provide credit financing. EMCs are very new
and financial institutions do not have widespread experiences with the mechanism and
perceive it as very risky. In addition, the newly founded EMCs lack established track
records and have difficulty structuring the type of strong collateral and/or guarantee
arrangements typically required by Chinese lenders. Therefore, EMCs find it very hard
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to get financing from the local-financing market. Among Chinese EMCs, only the
Liaoning EMC (one of the pilot EMCs) has successfully pioneered a strategic
partnership and line-of-credit arrangement with a Chinese commercial bank, but only
after demonstrating a track record of successful subprojects, strong management, a
viable business plan, and with the benefit of GEF and IBRD financial commitments
already in place. (WB, 2002)
(4) Difficulties in securing sufficient equity financing
Equity financing is important to the development of EMCs, especially if EMCs are
to provide at least some financing for their projects. Securing equity investment also is
often subject to the problems noted above, and it is often a chicken-and-egg problem
with respect to credit financing: If credit financing can be secured, equity investments
are easier to obtain, and vice versa. (WB, 2002)
(5) Lack of incentive from a government-supported policy
As analyzed in Chapter 6, government-supported policy is very important to
ESCOs' development especially at the initial stage. Currently, EMCs are not
distinguished from other companies regarding the legal setting. Some supporting
policies, such as favorable tax policy, government-procurement policy, and financing-
support policy, are not in place for China's EMCs development. Therefore, EMCs lack
economic incentives to attract investment.
Prospects for EMCs in China
China has the largest potential for energy-efficiency improvement in the world as
it is the second largest energy consumer and its energy intensity is far higher than
developed countries. China has realized the importance of energy efficiency and has
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been promoting some energy-efficiency programs, such as Green Lights, Green
Refrigerators, Standards and Labeling for industrial energy use and building energy
use, and the Voluntary Agreements. Therefore, EMCs have a great potential to develop
in China.
The WB/GEF China Energy Conservation Project has successfully demonstrated
that EMCs are viable under Chinese conditions. However, the experiences of three
pilot EMCs also show that EMCs are not simple and easy. The business requires
striking a difficult balance between financial risk and returns, between investment and
service, between technical value-added and minimal technical risk, and between new
business models and traditional methods of doing business. EMCs must maintain a
high-quality technical staff, seek out new technologies and practices to maintain a
competitive edge, achieve corporate growth without sacrificing quality and customer
service, replicate and expand promising project lines while maintaining high financial
returns and repayments, and develop innovate ways to isolate project cash flows in less
creditworthy enterprises. (WB, 2002)
The prospects of EMCs depend on the government's effective support. At
present, promotion of EMCs has become an important part of the government's overall
energy-conservation policy. To remove the barriers identified above to further EMCs'
development, the WB/GEF China Energy Conservation Project 11 has been approved in
2002. The two main components are: (1) an EMC service component designed to
provide in-depth, practical technical assistance to new and emerging EMCs on setting
up and developing their business; and (2) an EMC loan-guarantee program designed to
provide new and emerging EMCs with enhanced opportunities to receive loans from
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domestic banks and to engage the banks in developing a sustainable EMC industry
(WB, 2002). This project is currently underway and China's EMC business is expected
to grow substantially as the target barriers are removed.
China's expected rapid economic development and associated environmental
issues will continually favor energy efficiency as a resource. The EMC business, as an
effective mechanism to promote energy efficiency, will prosper with China's
improvement in the financial markets and its legal system, as well as the placement of a
government-supported policy. The expansion of China's EMCs will make very
substantial contributions toward reducing adverse environmental impacts and
supporting sustainable development both in China and the world.
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APPENDIX-1 PICTURE: BURNING EXCESS COAL GAS
Source: Yabei Zhang, taken during the AGS field trip in Shanxi Province, July 2002.
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APPENDIX-2 ENERGY-RELATED UNIT-CONVERSION REFERENCES
1 BTU = 1055.056 Joules (J)
1 Gigajoules (GJ) = 109 J
1 Megajoules (MJ) = 106J
1 Watt hour (Wh) = 3,600 J
1 Kilowatt hour (Kwh) = 3.6 * 106 j
1 ton (US or Short) = 0.907 tonne
1 tonne = 1.102 tons
1 tonne coal = 29.3 GJ
Source: http://www.diqitaldutch.com/unitconverter/
Coal Equivalent Value
coal tonne 1.00
firewood (air dried) tonne 0.46
kerosene tonne 1.47
natural gas 1,000 m3  1.19
gasoline (petrol) barrel 0.18
gasoil/diesel barrel 0.20
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Source: Amos M. Mutiga. n.d. "Energy Data Conversions."
http://www.afrepren.orq/conver.pdf
